14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
188.
On 16 January,
the UOR business case to modify existing Snatch vehicles
for
deployment
in Iraq was approved.92
The case
for the “desertisation” of vehicles was at
a cost of
£2.2m, with a completion date of May 2004. The modified version of
Snatch
became
known as the “Snatch 1.5” variant.
189.
The business
case stated:
•
While the
requirement had originally been for 228 vehicles, only 208
Snatch
were
available “without an unmanageable impact” on Northern
Ireland
operations.
•
“Recent
attacks have highlighted the need for protected mobility
capable
of providing
protection from small arms and IEDs.”
•
Snatch was
not designed for expeditionary operations and modifications
to
its communications
and air conditioning were required for operations in
Iraq.
•
The
modifications were “a short‑term solution to meet immediate
needs”.
•
DEC(SP) was
reviewing options to provide a more durable
medium‑term
solution,
funded from the core equipment programme, “for introduction
not
before late
2004/2005”.
•
The other
protective vehicles in use, Challenger 2, Warrior, CVR(T) and
Saxon,
were “not
available in sufficient numbers, nor are they appropriate to the
majority
of tasks
due to profile and size”.
190.
Lieutenant
General Andrew Ridgway, Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI),
briefed
the Chiefs
of Staff on the IED threat on 21 January.93
He
stated:
“Although
it was assessed that the transfer of terrorist technology from
North to
South Iraq
meant MND(SE) could expect an increased threat from IEDs, there
was
still no
evidence of a co‑ordinated campaign.”
191.
In his
post‑tour report on 30 January, Maj Gen Lamb
recorded:
“There is
consistent level of attack at five/six weekly and it is anticipated
that this
192.
On 8 February,
Major General Andrew Figgures, the Senior British
Military
Representative
in Iraq and Deputy Commanding General Multi‑National
Force‑Iraq,
reported to
Gen Walker and Lt Gen Reith about an attack on one
of the Snatch vehicles
deployed to
Baghdad:
“Although
we were fortunate in this case it raises a number of wider issues
of the
application
of our national doctrine and equipment in this theatre. The Snatch
vehicle
92
Paper MOD,
16 January 2004, ‘UOR 10383 Business Case – Op TELIC
SNATCH’.
93
Minutes, 21
January 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
94
Report
Lamb, 30 January 2004, ‘Post Operational Tour Report – Version 1
Operation TELIC 2/3 11 July
to 28
December 2003’.
35