13.1 |
Resources
539.
FCO, DFID and
MOD Ministers were invited to agree a GCPP Strategy for Iraq
on
1
August.328
The
strategy aimed to provide a coherent framework for UK activities
aimed
at
preventing conflict in Iraq. It comprised three
elements:
•
Security
Sector Reform (SSR). This would be the “initial focus of
activity”.
Ministers
were invited to agree that expenditure on SSR activities could
start
immediately
while work continued to define the other elements of the
strategy.
•
Assistance
to “Iraqi Governorates and local administrations within the British
AO
[Area of
Operations] as they develop to ensure that policy decisions are
made
strategically
and with an understanding of conflict prevention
issues”.
•
Further
studies and analyses to assist in the development of UK
conflict
prevention
strategies.
540.
The estimated
cost of the strategy was £7.5m in both 2003/04 and 2004/05.
Of the
£15m total,
£9.5m was allocated for SSR, £4m for local governance and £1.5m
for
further
studies and analyses.
541.
On 3 June
2003, following a visit to Iraq at the end of May, Mr Blair
chaired
a meeting
attended by Mr Hoon, Baroness Amos (the International
Development
Secretary),
Sir Michael Jay (in Mr Straw’s absence) and No.10
officials.329
Mr Blair
said
he had
returned from Iraq convinced that “an enormous amount needed to be
done”.
The
Government should go back to “a war footing” for the next two to
three months to
avoid
“losing the peace in Iraq”.
542.
Section 10.1
describes how, in July 2003, the Government took on the
leadership
of
Coalition Provisional Authority (South) (CPA(South)) without
considering the
significant
strategic, resource and reputational implications of such a
decision.
543.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Boateng on 18 July, seeking £30.4m from the
Reserve to
cover
additional costs incurred by the FCO relating to Iraq for
2003/04.330
Mr Straw
stated that
he had been reluctant to put in a Reserve claim, “not least because
of
Gordon’s
[Mr Brown’s] strictures about the pressure on it”. The FCO
had, however,
reached the
limit of its ability to manage the constant new demands on its
resources:
“… the
continuing need to fund Afghanistan operations in Kabul and
London;
Iraq costs;
and the costs of increased security around the world in the light
of the
Al‑Qaida
threat, heightened by Britain’s role in Iraq …
328
Minute IPU
[junior official] to PS/Baroness Symons, 1 August 2003, ‘Global
Conflict Prevention Pool –
Iraq
Strategy’.
329
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 3
June’.
330
Letter
Straw to Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 18 July 2003,
‘Iraq‑Related
Costs’.
533