The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
577.
The JIC
assessed that:
“If the
Coalition does not deal with the MEK, Iran may make limited
cross-border
rocket
attacks on them … [T]he Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
might
act to
undermine any post-Saddam peace that did not take Iran’s concerns
into
account …
We judge that both Iranian conservatives and reformers are anxious
to
avoid
provoking a US-led attack on Iran. We therefore assess that
Iranian-inspired
terrorist
attacks on Coalition forces are unlikely, unless the Iranians
thought
the US had
decided to attack them after an Iraq campaign.”
578.
The JIC
assessed that the Iranian regime was preoccupied with domestic
concerns
and was not
in a strong position to project its power into Iraq.
579.
Shia politics
in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq were described as “highly
unpredictable”:
“Saddam’s
regime has centralised power and stifled opposition. The only
networks
of
influence in the South that exist outside of the Ba’ath Party are
the tribes and
the
followers of some of the senior Shia clerics. Once the regime has
collapsed,
Coalition
forces will find the remains of the state’s bureaucratic
structures, local tribal
sheiks and
religious leaders. There will also be a number of fractious armed
groups,
some
strengthened by arms seized during the collapse of the regime. The
external
opposition
will attempt to assert authority, but only those with armed forces
on the
ground or
support from senior Shia clerics, such as SCIRI or Da’wa, another
Shia
Islamist
group, are likely to succeed to any extent …
“Given that
the Shia in southern Iraq have borne the brunt of regime
oppression
since 1991,
there is a high probability of revenge killing of Ba’ath officials,
both
Sunni and
Shia. This could be particularly widespread and bloody … Beyond
that
the extent
of any further breakdown of law and order is difficult to predict.
But there
will be
large numbers of armed groups and some potential for tribal
score-settling
… Overall
there is a risk of a wider breakdown as the regime’s authority
crumbles.
There are
no indications, however, of Shia preparations for an all-out civil
war
against
Sunni Iraqis … Iraqis may not welcome Coalition military forces,
despite
welcoming
the overthrow of Saddam. The
establishment of popular support
for any
post-Saddam administration cannot be taken for granted.
It could
be
undermined
by:
•
damage to
holy sites;
•
major
civilian casualties;
•
lack of a
UNSCR authorising a new administration;
•
heavy-handed
peace enforcement;
•
failure to
meet popular expectations over humanitarian aid and
reconstruction;
•
failure
rapidly to restore law and order;
412