The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

implemented the policy of sanctions meant that too was “a moral choice with bad and

devastating consequences for the Iraqi people”.

304. Asked about the origins and accuracy of the dossier produced by No.10, (‘Iraq –

Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’ – see Section 4.3),

Mr Blair said that the part of the document that dealt with intelligence was from

intelligence sources and was accurate, as was the document as a whole.

305. In his memoir, Mr Cook wrote:

“What was novel … was the way in which Tony has shifted the terms in which

he justifies military intervention. For the first time he argued that war would be

preferable to sanctions because of the suffering and malnutrition that comes

in the wake of sanctions.”83

306. At Sir Richard Dearlove’s request, his Private Secretary sent an update

on the progress of inspections to Sir David Manning on 12 February.84

307. Sir David was told that the strike rate in relation to the UK intelligence-led

inspections was low, but it had been responsible for two out of three UNMOVIC finds

to date, from more than 550 inspections. In addition, “even where there is no WMD,

something else has often been concealed […] Our inspections have revealed the

Iraqi game.”

308. Sir Richard’s update also stated that “we needed to keep going in the expectation

that an intelligence-led inspection would lead to a find or a solid refusal of entry”.

309. Sir David sent the letter to Mr Powell with the comment: “More inspections ahead –

but time getting very short.”85

310. The UK used about 30 separate pieces of intelligence from human sources and

satellite imagery covering 19 sites to provide leads for the UN inspectors. UNMOVIC

visited seven of those sites, made a partial examination of one more and subjected one

further site to an inspection by ground-penetrating radar.86

311. In a ‘Note’ produced on 12 February, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) Counter

Proliferation Support Group reported that UNMOVIC and the IAEA had conducted over

550 site visits or inspections.87

83 Cook R. The Point of Departure. Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.

84 Letter PS/C to Manning, 12 February 2003, ‘Update on Intelligence-Led UNMOVIC Inspections’.

85 Manuscript comment Manning to Powell, 12 February 2003, on Letter PS/C to Manning,

12 February 2003, ‘Update on Intelligence-Led UNMOVIC Inspections’.

86 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004 HC 898,

paragraph 357.

87 Note DIS Counter Proliferation Support Group, 12 February 2003, ‘The Effectiveness of UN Weapons

Inspections in Iraq’.

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