The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to support
the ISF until the end of 2007, and for advisory teams at least
until 2009.
Assessing
those targets, the JIC judged:
“… the ISF
and MNF together have been unable to contain the level of
violence,
which
continues to grow. If the insurgency persists at anywhere near
current
levels,
these timeframes will be unachievable, at least in Baghdad and
the
Sunni heartlands.”
755.
A report to
Congress on 13 October stated that IMOD force generation was
due
to be
complete by late 2006 and MOI force generation complete by August
2007.706
On 27
September 2005, an IPU official wrote to Mr Straw with details
of the Joint Committee
to Transfer
Security Responsibility (JCTSR). The JCTSR had been established in
July and
tasked with
establishing the conditions to permit transfer of security
responsibility to the
Iraqi
civilian authorities.707
Membership
included the Iraqi Interior and Defence Ministers,
the
National Security Adviser, the UK and the US Ambassadors and the
Commander and
Deputy
Commander of MNF‑I.
The
Committee published its conditions for transferring security
responsibility to an Iraqi
civilian
authority on 10 October 2005.708
Those fell
into four categories for both urban and
provincial
areas:
•
Threat
assessment: MOI, IMOD, MNF‑I and the National
Intelligence
Coordination
Council (NICC) assess the threat from terrorist/insurgents
as
low, and
steady or on a downward trend determined by the IMOD, MOI
and
MNF‑I. For
provincial areas, the threat to critical infrastructure and lines
of
communication
should also be assessed as low.
•
Iraqi Security
Forces readiness: The IPS has capacity (at TRA level 2
[TRA
levels are
explained in Box, ‘Provincial Iraqi Control’]) to maintain domestic
order
and prevent
the resurgence of terrorism. The Iraqi Army are able to respond
to
requests
for assistance from the city and able to contain the insurgency in
the
provinces
with appropriate support.
•
Governance:
The Governor must be capable of overseeing security
operations
in the
urban area and province, as assessed by the IMOD, MOI, Ministry
of
Justice,
the Ministry of Human Rights, the US Embassy and MNF‑I. The
PJCC
must be
operational and co‑ordinating operations and there must be systems
in
place for
detention, trial and incarceration under Iraqi law.
•
Coalition
forces: must maintain the capability to reinforce if ISF
capabilities
are
exceeded; co‑ordinate civil construction activities; provide
support and
force
protection for Transition Teams; and retain freedom of movement and
the
capability
to conduct counter‑terrorism operations.
706
Report to
Congress, 13 October 2005, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
707
Minute IPU
[junior official] to Straw, 27 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Transition:
The Joint Committee to
Transfer
Security Responsibility’.
708
Paper
Republic of Iraq National Security Council, 10 October 2005, ‘Joint
Committee to Transfer
Security
Responsibility’.
226