10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
43.
Section 9.3
describes the Sadrist uprising in Najaf in early August, and
the
deteriorating
security situation across Iraq.
44.
Mr Blair
concluded at the end of August that Prime Minister Allawi needed
“help
now”. That
help included accelerating the pace of reconstruction, so that
Iraqis saw
improvements
before the January 2005 elections.
45.
Mr Phillipson
wrote to the Cabinet Office on 20 August to commission
a:
“… full
picture of the situation in Iraq after the National
Conference,18
how we
are
going to
get from here to successful elections in January, and the
challenges we
46.
Mr Phillipson
advised that the request followed a “long discussion” the previous
day
with
Mr Blair, who had observed that the security situation, the
slow rate at which the ISF
was being
trained and equipped, and “ongoing difficulties” with
reconstruction posed a
real risk
to the achievement of the UK’s objectives in Iraq.
47.
The British
Embassy Office Basra reported by telegram on 24 August that the
PCO
Regional
Co-ordinator had now arrived.20
The
Co-ordinator expected the PCO to “have
an impact
on the ground” in the last quarter of 2004; the British Embassy
Office doubted
that the
PCO could meet that timeline.
48.
On 27 August,
in response to Mr Phillipson’s commission, the IPU provided a
paper
for the
Cabinet Office.21
Mr Neil
Crompton, the Head of the IPU, advised Mr Straw’s
Private
Office that the paper contained “little new in policy
terms”.
49.
The IPU paper
concluded that the strategy agreed by DOP on 15 July was the
right
one, but
would require regular fine-tuning.22
Its key
judgements included:
•
The IIG had
made a good start, but needed to deliver results soon,
particularly
on security
but also on essential services.
•
There was
growing “disquiet” in the “previously benign” South, reinforced
by
a sense
that Baghdad and the US were neglecting its interests.
Politically,
Basra and
Maysan were paralysed by power struggles, hindering work
on
reconstruction
and security.
•
Iraq was
“awash with reconstruction funds”. The challenge was
delivering
quickly on
the ground. Security was a major hindrance.
18
From 15 to
18 August a National Conference was held to select an Iraqi Interim
National Council (IINC)
of 100
members to oversee the Iraqi Interim Government until the election
of the Transitional National
Assembly in
January 2005.
19
Letter
Phillipson to Fergusson, 20 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
20
Telegram
130 Basra to FCO London, 24 August 2004, ‘southern Iraq: PCO and
Saudi Development
Fund’.
21
Minute
Crompton to Private Secretary [FCO], 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’ attaching Paper IPU,
27 August
2004, ‘Iraq: Next Steps’.
22
Paper IPU,
27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next Steps’.
205