The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
credible
opposition figure and CIA have not been engaged with the INC since
1996.
Indeed as
it is currently organised the INC is less than the sum of its
parts. We
assess that it
would have a nugatory role in any regime change scenario
–
US
are well
aware that the INC (and other exile groups) are completely
penetrated by
Iraqi
intelligence.”
141.
The concluding
section addressed Iraq after Saddam Hussein:
“We assess
that despite potential instability Iraq will remain a unitary
state. But
many of
Iraq’s structural problems will remain. Sunni hegemony, the
position of
the Kurds
and Shia, enmity with Kuwait, infighting among the elite,
autocratic rule
and
anti-Israeli sentiment will not disappear with Saddam. We should
also expect
considerable
anti-Western sentiment among a populace that has experienced
ten
years of
sanctions.
“A US
attempt to create a more equitable long-term distribution of power
in Iraq
would
require massive and lengthy commitment. Modern Iraq has been
dominated
politically,
militarily and socially by the Sunni. To alter that would entail
re-creation
of Iraq’s
civil, political and military structures. That would require a
US-directed
transition
of power (ie US troops occupying Baghdad) and support
thereafter.
Ten years
seems a not unrealistic time span for such a project.”
142.
The paper was
sent to Mr Hoon, the Chiefs of Staff, Sir Kevin
Tebbit,
Mr Webb,
Lieutenant General Sir Anthony Pigott (Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff
(Commitments))
and a small number of other individuals. It was also sent to Mr
Scarlett
and the
Assessments Staff, Mr Tom Dodd (OD Sec), Dr Amanda Tanfield (Head
of Iraq
Section in
MED) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).
143.
The paper was
later included in the pack of reading material on Iraq for Mr
Blair
sent to
No.10 by Mr Scarlett on 1 August.
144.
On 8 March,
the Cabinet Office raised the potential long-term consequences
of
a
full-scale military campaign in Iraq in a paper preparing the
ground for the meeting
between Mr
Blair and President Bush in Crawford, Texas, on 6
April.
145.
The ‘Iraq:
Options Paper’, addressed in more detail in Section 3.2,
was
commissioned
by Sir David Manning and co-ordinated by OD Sec.90
It was sent
to
Mr Blair
by Sir David Manning on 8 March, as part of the collection of
“background
briefs that
you asked for” for the meeting with President Bush.
146.
The paper was
prepared as background. It did not represent agreed
interdepartmental
advice for Ministers.
90
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 8 March 2002, ‘Briefing for the
US’.
138