4.4 | The
search for WMD
as
intelligence on WMD infrastructure and was very critical of the US
debriefing
process.
•
Residual
pre-1991 stocks in Iraq. The ISG believed that any remaining
chemical
munitions
did not pose a militarily significant threat to Coalition Forces.
Iraq
had “never
successfully formulated” BW agents “for long term storage”.
Any
remaining
BW agents thus posed little or no risk to Coalition Forces or
civilians.
•
Iraq’s
Military Industrial Commission. Reports that Qusay Hussein had
asked
for a list
of Iraqi BW experts to be compiled for him to pass to Syria and
that an
Iraqi
computer hacker claimed to be able to hack into US military
satellites might
arouse some
interest.
878.
A fifth annex
containing an outline plan for future investigation of possible
WMD
links with
Syria was under consideration.
879.
Mr Ehrman
did not expect publication of the annexes to attract major
media
interest.
He advised that the ISG would “effectively wind up” in January
2005, with
responsibility
for WMD issues passing to the MNF in Baghdad.
880.
The ISG
continued into 2005 as Mr Duelfer completed work, in
Washington, on the
Addendums
to the September 2004 Comprehensive Report.493
881.
On
25 February 2005, Mr Ehrman reported to Sir Nigel
Sheinwald that the text had
been sent
to the printers and was expected to be published in early to
mid-March.494
He
explained that the final version included an additional one-page
annex on possible
pre-conflict
movement of WMD out of Iraq. The ISG had been unable to rule
out
unofficial
movement of limited WMD materials, but judged it unlikely that an
official
transfer
had taken place.
882.
Mr Ehrman
attached draft press lines prepared by the FCO and the
MOD.
He advised
that the main points remained unchanged:
•
“Saddam had
strategic intent to reconstitute Iraq’s WMD programmes
when
sanctions
were lifted”.
•
“Iraq
repeatedly breached Security Council Resolutions, including
1441”.
•
“[S]anctions
were progressively eroding before the conflict”.
“If asked
about the Report’s conclusion that, by the mid-1990s Iraq was
essentially
free of
WMD, we will refer to the Prime Minister’s statement of
28 September 2004
in Brighton
that ‘evidence about Saddam having actual BW and CW weapons,
as
opposed to
the capability to develop them, has turned out to be
wrong’.”
493
Op
ROCKINGHAM Weekly No.94, 20-27 April 2005.
494
Minute
Ehrman to Sheinwald, 25 February 2005, ‘ISG Report on Iraq
WMD’ attaching Paper [MOD and
FCO],
[undated], ‘The Publication of the Iraq Survey Group Final
Report’.
601