9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
611.
A more
detailed paper attached noted that the numbers of Army units
deployed
in
operations (including Iraq) was greater than envisaged in the
Defence Planning
Assumptions
(DPAs).345
As a
result:
“If the MOD
seeks to return within DPAs then drawdown must be sought from
…
other
theatres, reflecting TELIC’s position as the UK’s military ME [Main
Effort]. As
the
Coalition scale of effort reduces in Iraq the UK faces a choice:
either UK military
scale of
effort decreases in step with the Coalition, or, UK military effort
continues
at MS
[Medium Scale], proportionally increasing our contribution to the
Coalition.
The UK
would therefore have greater ownership of the campaign and
greater
influence
on its success. In this scenario, UK military deployment may not
be
limited to
MND(SE).”
612.
On 10
December, Sir Nigel Sheinwald chaired a video conference with Dr
Rice
and members
of her team, including Ambassador Blackwill (who led in Washington
on
the Iraqi
political process).346
Ambassador
Blackwill suggested that Grand Ayatollah
al-Sistani’s
stance seemed to be softening on direct elections, but the lack of
a direct
line of
communication made this uncertain.
613.
A day later,
Mr Straw’s Private Secretary reported to Mr Rycroft that
there had
been little
progress with the new political timetable, mainly because Grand
Ayatollah
al-Sistani
had argued that members of the Transitional Legislative Assembly
should
be selected
by direct election, rather than through the caucus elections
outlined in
614.
The Private
Secretary added that Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s intervention
had
met strong
opposition from most members of the GC and the CPA. No GC
member
was at that
point pushing for direct elections but they were advocating changes
in the
way the
caucus elections were organised, to ensure that Ba’athists did not
re-emerge
as a
political force. They were trying to sell this approach to Grand
Ayatollah al-Sistani.
The CPA
was prepared to be flexible on the implementation of the
agreement,
but not the
principles.
615.
On 13
December, US forces found and captured former President
Saddam
Hussein. He
was hiding in a cellar in the town of al-Dawr, 15km south of
Tikrit.348
616.
Ambassador
Bremer held a press conference, at which he said:
“The tyrant
is a prisoner.
345
Minute
DJtCts and Dir Sec IRAQ to COSSEC, 3 December 2003, ‘Op Telic – A
DJtCts Review of UK
military
strategy for Iraq’.
346
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 10 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Video-Conference with US
National Security
Council’.
347
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 11 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
348
BBC
News, 14
December 2003, Bremer’s
statement in full.
309