The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Support helicopters were identified as “a clear pinch point”. The eight Chinook

Mk3 ordered in 1995 but not available for use would not be ready for another

two years (see Box, ‘The eight modified Chinooks’, in Section 14.1).

• The UK had only enough tented accommodation for “some 2,500 personnel”.

The remainder of the stock was in use on other operations in Afghanistan, the

Balkans and Oman. Acquiring more was identified as a high priority.

76.  The assessment was sent to Adm Boyce and a limited number of senior MOD

officials and military officers.

77.  Adm Boyce instructed that the advice should be circulated to the Single Service

Chiefs, who were not on the original distribution.35

78.  In response to a suggestion from his Private Office that the work be shared with the

Chief of Defence Logistics, Adm Boyce wrote: “No, not yet.”36

79.  Shortly afterwards, Sir Kevin Tebbit’s Private Secretary sent a minute to Mr Webb

and Lieutenant General Sir Anthony Pigott, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff

(Commitments) (DCDS(C)), proposing a limited core distribution list for Iraq contingency

planning.37 He wrote: “There may be occasions when you (or indeed the Spending

Review team) feel that an even more limited distribution should apply but I would hope

this would not be frequent.”

80.  The list did not include the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) or the Defence

Procurement Agency (DPA). Neither organisation had been consulted on the

9 May advice.

81.  The MOD established an informal inter-departmental group of senior officials for

planning purposes, which became known as the “Pigott Group”. The Pigott Group was

supported by a Strategic Planning Group (SPG) and both are described in Section 6.1.

82.  Lt Gen Pigott sent Mr Hoon an update on the SPG’s work on 10 May.38 Lt Gen Pigott

stated:

“Any thinking we do about joining the US in military operations against the Iraqi

regime needs to be informed by our thinking in two key areas: the impact of potential

courses of action open to a coalition and the capability the UK might contribute to

such a coalition.”

83.  Work had been commissioned on the capabilities the UK might aim to provide

within periods of three to four and six to eight months, setting out the key decision

35  Manuscript comment Adm Boyce on Minute Witney to PS/PUS [MOD], 9 May 2002, ‘Iraq – Equipment

Lead Times’.

36  Manuscript comment Adm Boyce on Minute Witney to PS/PUS [MOD], 9 May 2002, ‘Iraq – Equipment

Lead Times’.

37  Minute PS/PUS [MOD] to Policy Director and DCDS(C), May 2002, ‘Iraq’.

38  Minute DCDS(C) to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.

14