9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
Sadrists
and the Sunni insurgents”. Mr Blair “urged him to set out a
plan that made clear
what they
needed to do, and by when”.
“… Maliki
said he was considering a one month amnesty for the militia
elements.
After that
there would be no compromise, and he would give the ISF clear
authority
to deal
with those who continued to defy the Government. The Prime
Minister
welcomed
this – action had to be taken against the death squads, and a
clear
political
signal given to the ISF that they should go after them with all
necessary
means.”
104.
Prime Minister
Maliki said that he was committed to dealing with Basra’s
problems:
“The
committee he had established to take forward the security plan was
reporting
directly to
him, and he denied that it was sectarian in its approach. He
emphasises
the
importance of strengthening the ISF so that arrests were made by
Iraqi, not
British,
forces. But he also commented that the police force was hopelessly
corrupt.”
105.
Mr Blair
discussed Iraq briefly with President Bush on 26 July, and
exchanged
reports on
their recent meetings with Prime Minister Maliki, who had visited
both London
and
Washington that week.70
Mr Blair
said he had made it clear to Prime Minister Maliki
that he
must tackle the death squads operating in Baghdad.
106.
On 26 July,
the JIC considered how the Sadrist militia, Jaysh al‑Mahdi (JAM),
was
likely to
react to pressure.71
107.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements were:
“I. Jaysh
al‑Mahdi is not a monolithic or disciplined organisation. Some
elements are
responsible
for the worst Shia sectarian atrocities. Limited and targeted
detention
operations
against the perpetrators are militarily achievable and would be
locally
disruptive.
They would have a temporary impact on the overall scale of
sectarian
violence.
“II. Any
perception that a wider assault on JAM had begun would be likely
to
provoke
fierce resistance. Muqtada al‑Sadr’s reaction even to further
limited arrests
is
unpredictable … If he felt personally threatened he might order a
return to
large‑scale
violence.
“III.
Al‑Sadr’s reponse might be constrained if robust action was led by
the Iraqi
Government
and security forces (ISF). But even limited detentions will
need
unequivocal
public support from Prime Minister Maliki, key government
ministers
and other
senior Shia figures. Maliki’s commitment to achieving the
necessary
70
Letter
Phillipson to Hayes, 26 July 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s Phone Call
with President Bush, 26 July: Iraq,
Middle
East’.
71
JIC
Assessment, 26 July 2006, ‘Iraq: How will Jaysh al‑Mahdi React to
Pressure?’
21