13.1 |
Resources
366.
Most of the
issues raised
at Mr Blair’s meeting on 6 March, including the role of
the
UN,
sectorisation and the nature of the UK’s post‑conflict contribution
in Iraq, remained
unresolved
as the invasion began (see Section 6.5).
367.
Mr Hoon
and Mr Straw sent Mr Blair a joint minute on the UK
military contribution
to
post‑conflict Iraq on 19 March.216
The minute,
copies of which were sent to Mr Brown,
Ms Short
and Sir David Manning, invited agreement to five propositions
including:
“In broad
terms the MOD will need to draw down its scale of effort to nearer
a third of
its
commitment by the autumn.”
368.
That reduced
commitment would equate to “a maximum of around one brigade,
a
two star
headquarters and possibly a contribution to higher level command
and control,
air and
maritime components, and support enablers”.
369.
The joint
minute gave little detail of what UK forces would be required to
do
immediately
after the invasion:
“The
expectation is that UK forces would be responsible for a task
focused on Basra
and other
key military objectives in the south east of Iraq … This task is
broadly
proportionate
to the size of the UK’s contribution to overall Coalition land
forces …”
370.
The joint
minute stated that US planning remained “sensibly flexible” once
the
initial
phase was over and “a major part of Iraq has been stabilised”. It
would be
premature
to take a view on the merits of sectorisation for that
stage.
371.
Mr Rycroft
informed the FCO and the MOD on 21 March that Mr Blair agreed
to the
Straw/Hoon
recommendations, subject to further urgent advice on the size of
any UK
sector, the
duration of the UK commitment and the exit
strategy.217
372.
Mr Dodds
provided advice to Mr Brown on the joint minute on 24
March.218
Mr Dodds
reported that the picture looked “rather different to that
presented in the
correspondence”:
“The
Defence Chiefs say that a ‘medium size’ deployment (ie
10,000‑15,000) is the
most we
could sustain in the medium term without lasting damage to our
forces.
MOD
officials tell us they had intended the submission [the joint
minute] to pose the
question
‘do you want us to do as much as we can (ie this medium size
deployment)
216
Minute
Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution to
Post‑Conflict
Iraq’.
217
Minute
Rycroft to McDonald and Watkins, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution to
Post‑Conflict
Iraq’.
218
Minute
Dodds to Chancellor, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution
to Post‑Conflict Iraq’.
503