The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to gain
full appreciation of the additional capabilities available and how
they might
be used
in combination to deliver an effect.”326
612.
The Barry
Report published in August 2010 stated:
“The UOR
process did not produce enough equipment to meet the
training
requirements.
So some troops first encountered new equipments in
theatre
and
commanders assessed that casualties resulted, particularly in the
period
immediately
after a brigade relief in place.”327
613.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry:
“There is
no point being told ‘Here is a UOR for a nice gizmo, a nice new
piece of
kit which
you can only have, by the way, in theatre’, if the person operating
that kit
doesn’t see
it for the first time until he actually gets to theatre, because he
will die
trying to
learn how to use it.”328
Before
2006, it was not possible to purchase equipment with a training
margin with a
UOR. One of
the results of this was consistent reports from the field about the
difficulties
presented
by the lack of training on equipment that personnel would use once
deployed.
A DOC
report in September 2007 stated:
“Combat
Body Armour (CBA), protected vehicles, comms and ECM(FP)
(Electronic
Counter
Measure Force Protection) equipment, particularly UOR
procured
equipment,
were regularly unavailable for training/familiarisation at
PDT
[Pre-Deployment
Training].”329
Major
General William Rollo, GOC MND(SE) from July 2004 to December 2004,
wrote in
his
post-operation tour report:
“More
training on Snatch and other UOR equipments … must be factored
into
pre-deployment
preparation.”330
That point
was reiterated in post-operation tour reports from the following
two successors
to his
role, Major General Jonathon Riley and Major General James
Dutton.331
326
Report DOC,
17 October 2003, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study’.
327
Report Land
Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From
a Land Perspective’.
328
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 102.
329
Report DOC,
September 2007, ‘Protection of the Deployed Force Operational Audit
Report 1/07’.
330
Report HQ
MND(SE), 4 December 2004, ‘Post Operation Report Operation
TELIC 4/5 – 14 July –
1 December
2004’.
331
Report HQ
MND(SE), 10 June 2005, ‘Progress Report – Operation TELIC’;
Report HQ MND(SE),
18 January
2006, ‘Progress Report – Operation TELIC’.
100