6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
niche
capabilities in 1 (UK) Div. Mr Hoon had agreed that the UK should
encourage US
commanders
to identify a niche role.
513.
The US was
looking at a number of variations to its plan, including
involving
7 Armoured
Brigade in “decisive manoeuvre operations beyond south-eastern
Iraq” and
“possibly
in a decisive phase around Baghdad”. That would raise a number of
issues,
including
for post-conflict operations:
“At the
beginning of Phase IV … operations, 1(UK) Division would initially
find itself
spread
across two different areas at once. While 7 Armoured Brigade was
engaged
in combat
operations around Baghdad, 1(UK) Division would have only its
two
light
brigades available to deal with any immediate problems in
south-eastern Iraq.
At the
very least we would need US assurances that they would facilitate
rapid
re- adjustment
at the earliest opportunity, to allow 7 Armoured Brigade to rejoin
the
rest of
1(UK) Division.”
514.
Mr Watkins
explained that Mr Hoon and the Chiefs of Staff had therefore
agreed
that the UK
“should not actively seek this sort of wider role, but that we
should be
prepared to
consider any unsolicited US requests on their merits”. The MOD
would
produce
further advice on the outcome of discussions with the US, but
warned it was
likely that
“decisions may need to be made very rapidly”.
515.
In early
March, Lt Gen Reith discussed the expansion of the UK combat
role
with US
commanders. He continued to advise the Chiefs of Staff to extend
the
UK AO.
516.
Lt Gen Reith
visited the Middle East from 5 to 7 March where he
discussed
optimising
the use of 1 (UK) Div combat power “in some detail” with General
John
Abizaid,
Gen Franks’ Deputy Commander (Forward), and then with Lt Gen
McKiernan.170
517.
The record of
the visit stated that Lt Gen Reith “offered” two options for UK
forces
to play a
role in later operations:
•
using 7
Armoured Brigade to provide additional combat power to either 1 MEF
or
5 Corps in
their advance on Baghdad; or
•
16 Air
Assault Brigade to be deployed forward by air to the Baghdad area
to
“assist in
developing stability in case of sudden regime
collapse”.
518.
A manuscript
note on Maj Gen Fry’s copy of the record stated:
“CDS was
most unhappy … COS [Chiefs of Staff] & SofS [Secretary of
State]
riding
instructions were to not offer anything outside the UK AO but be
receptive
to requests
(‘request mode rather than push mode’). CDS wanted to talk to
CJO
170
Minute
Dutton to PSO/CDS, 7 March 2003, ‘CJO Visit to Middle East 5-7 Mar
03’.
465