The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
405.
On
inspections, Sir David advised:
“My sense
is that the Americans are close to giving up hope that UNMOVIC
can
deliver
results. We should urge them to stick with it. UNMOVIC only reached
full
strength at
Christmas … The inspectors needed targeted support; and time to
build
up
operating skills. Even so, it’s true that the chances of them
finding a smoking gun
are
relatively small which is why we need a defector if we can get one.
But this too,
needs
time.
“The
Americans are in a hurry; perhaps too much of one. This colours
their
approach to
UNMOVIC and makes them impatient … Too much looks like
hurried
improvisation,
half thought out strategy, with fingers crossed that Saddam
will
collapse in
short order …”
406.
Sir David
concluded that there was a danger of the US being driven by the
tempo
of the
military build‑up and understandable preference to fight in the
spring not the
summer. In
his view, “more time” was needed “to build the case against Saddam
and
improve the
odds for a second resolution”.
407.
In a
manuscript note on Mr Straw’s letter of 3 January,
Sir David Manning told
Mr Blair
that Washington was “aware of the pitfalls and thinking in terms of
a second
408.
Sir David
Manning discussed potential developments before Dr Blix’s
report to the
Security
Council on 27 January with Dr Rice on 3 January. “Emphasising
that he was
speaking
personally”, he told Dr Rice that he was:
“…
convinced that we needed a second resolution; and that we would
only get one
if we could
produce convincing evidence that Saddam was in breach.
Supposition
would not
be enough. Apart from the problem of the Security Council, we would
not
be able to
get endorsement from the House of Commons for military action
…”145
409.
Sir David
suggested the pursuit of a three‑part policy:
•
compiling a
register of intelligence reports that pointed to specific
locations
where
Saddam Hussein might be hiding WMD, or documents relevant
to
the WMD
programme, and trying “to persuade Dr Blix to mount
co‑ordinated
surprise
inspections [...] It was much too early to assume that the
inspection
route would
yield nothing”;
•
urging
Dr Blix to state publicly that there were numerous gaps and
unanswered
questions
in the declaration: “By demanding that Saddam produce the
missing
pieces we
would be putting the pressure back on him in a way which
his
apologists
would find difficult to counter”; and
144
Manuscript
comment Manning to PM, 3 January 2003, on Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 3 January
2003, ‘Iraq
– Plan B’.
145
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
74