The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Those
divisions were not created by the coalition, but they were
exacerbated by its
decisions
on de-Ba’athification and on demobilisation of the Iraqi Army and
were not
addressed
by an effective programme of reconciliation.
169.
In January
2009, the JIC judged “internal political failures that could lead
to
renewed
violence within and between Iraq’s Sunni, Shia and Kurdish
communities”56
to be
the greatest strategic threat to Iraq’s stability.
170.
The fragility
of the situation in Basra, which had been the focus of UK effort
in
MND(SE),
was clear. The JIC assessed that threats remained from
Iranian-backed
JAM Special
Groups, and the Iraqi Security Forces remained reliant on support
from
Multi-National
Forces to address weaknesses in leadership and tactical support.
Even
as UK
troops withdrew from Basra, the US was sufficiently concerned to
deploy its own
forces
there, to secure the border and protect supply lines.
171.
In 2009, Iraq
did have a democratically elected Parliament, in which many
of
Iraq’s
communities were represented. But, as demonstrated by the
protracted process
of
negotiating agreements on the status of US and then UK forces in
Iraq, and the
continued
absence of a much-needed Hydrocarbons Law, representation did
not
translate
into effective government. In 2008, Transparency International
judged Iraq to
be the
third most corrupt country in the world, and in mid-2009 the
Assessments Staff
judged that
Government ministries were “riddled with”
corruption.57
172.
By 2009, it
had been demonstrated that some elements of the UK’s
2003
objectives
for Iraq were misjudged. No evidence had been identified that Iraq
possessed
weapons of
mass destruction, with which it might threaten its neighbours and
the
international
community more widely. But in the years between 2003 and 2009,
events in
Iraq had
undermined regional stability, including by allowing Al Qaida space
in which to
operate and
unsecured borders across which its members might move.
173.
The gap
between the ambitious objectives with which the UK entered Iraq
and
the
resources that the Government was prepared to commit to the task
was substantial
from the
start. Even with more resources it would have been difficult to
achieve those
objectives,
as a result of the circumstances of the invasion, the lack of
international
support,
the inadequacy of planning and preparation, and the inability to
deliver law and
order. The
lack of security hampered progress at every turn. It is therefore
not surprising
that,
despite the considerable efforts made by UK civilian and military
personnel over
this
period, the results were meagre.
174.
The Inquiry
has not been able to identify alternative approaches that would
have
guaranteed
greater success in the circumstances of March 2003. What can be
said is
that a
number of opportunities for the sort of candid reappraisal of
policies that would
have better
aligned objectives and resources did not take place. There was no
serious
56
JIC
Assessment, 28 January 2009, ‘Iraq: Threats to Stability and UK
Mission Change in 2009’.
57
CIG
Assessment, 21 July 2009, ‘How Corrupt is Iraq?’
500