3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
then
“endorsed or mutated in group discussion”. Sir David Manning had
suggested
some
changes to the draft paper, but “they were not major”.
“… spending
some time debating as a group the final wording of the
statement
‘the use of
overriding force in a ground campaign is the only option that we
can be
confident
will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international
community’.”
342.
Lord
Goldsmith, the Attorney General, asked in early March to be
involved in
Ministerial
thinking about Iraq as policy was being formulated not just to be
asked
for his
advice at the last minute.
343.
On 8 March, Mr
Paul Berman, a member of the Attorney General’s
Office,
contacted
the Cabinet Office to say that Lord Goldsmith had seen the previous
week’s
Cabinet
Conclusions and would hope to be involved in Ministerial thinking
about Iraq as
policy was
being formulated rather than be consulted formally only at the last
minute.125
344.
Mr McKane,
explained to Mr Berman that Mr Blair had made clear to Cabinet
that
decisions
on military action were not imminent; and that it was “well
understood” that
the
Attorney General would need to be “properly engaged at the right
time” but that was
“most
unlikely to be before the Prime Minister’s meeting with President
Bush”.126
345.
Mr McKane
advised Sir David Manning that he thought there was:
“… a good
case for engaging the Attorney General in a discussion, so that
he
understands
the options and the policy background, before he is asked
formally
for advice.
Intriguingly Paul Berman said that the Attorney General did not
rule out
justification
for military action based on Article 51 (self defence) but would
certainly
want to be
assured that the alternatives (UN Security Council resolutions) had
been
thoroughly
explored in the first instance.”
346.
Sir David
Manning replied to Mr McKane: “I think we should engage the
Attorney
after the
Texan [Crawford] summit.”127
347.
In a minute to
Lord Goldsmith, Mr Berman recorded that he had told Mr
McKane
that Lord
Goldsmith:
“… wanted
to be in a position to engage constructively with this issue. This
meant
keeping you
in the loop from a very early stage, as policy was being
formulated,
125
Minute
McKane to Manning, 8 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
126
Minute
McKane to Manning, 8 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
127
Manuscript
comment Manning to McKane, 8 March 2002, on Minute McKane to
Manning,
8 March 2002,
‘Iraq’.
447