9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
•
an
announcement of the phased withdrawal of the MNF-I in 2005;
and
•
a new
resolution, to endorse the changed electoral
timetable.
199.
The FCO wrote
that there was no guarantee that the plan would have the
desired
impact on
the insurgency. The insurgents might conclude they were winning and
step
up their
campaign, leading to further postponement of
elections.
200.
In the paper
the FCO concluded that this was:
“An
unappealing contingency plan in almost all respects, underlining
the importance
of doing
everything we can to hold to Plan A, or, if there is to be a delay
in elections,
arguing the
case for a short delay, on UN advice, to a fixed
date.”
201.
The FCO view
was that in order to stay on track, the UK should:
•
ensure the
UN remained engaged, including by supporting the security
of
UN staff;
•
ensure
adequate Sunni outreach;
•
reduce
opposition to the presence of the MNF-I;
•
ensure
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani remained supportive; and
•
“sell” the
importance of sticking to the January 2005 timetable to Iraqis and
the
international
community.105
202.
The second
half of the paper considered a scenario in which the MNF-I
reduced
in size
before Iraqi Security Forces were capable of maintaining security
themselves.
203.
The FCO judged
that, while the insurgents “do not have the military capability
to
force the
US to withdraw … they could intimidate some coalition partners into
leaving”.
Although
that would require the US and UK to “make up the numbers”, it was
considered
a
manageable risk.
204.
A more
significant risk was the emergence of a strong “troops-out faction”
in the
Transitional
National Assembly, which required members of the MNF-I to stay in
their
barracks.
With Iraqi Security Forces unable to play their role, different
insurgent criminal
or tribal
forces would seek to fill the security vacuum:
“In the
Sunni triangle it would be the insurgents; in the Kurdish and Shia
areas the
established
militias … other parts of the country (e.g. Maysan and Dhi Qar)
would
be dominated
by criminals or tribes (or both) …
“In the
worst case scenario, Iraq would disintegrate into civil
war.”
105
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 12 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Contingency
Planning’.
429