6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
231.
Tasks
assigned to the IPU by the AHGI included consideration
of:
•
the shape
of the Iraqi political process needed to underpin the
transition
to Iraqi
rule;
•
management
of Iraq’s oil; and
•
whether and
where the UK should run its own sector before the
restoration
of Iraqi
sovereignty.
232.
After the
creation of the IPU, the AHGI remained responsible for
co-
ordination
of all post-conflict planning and preparation across
government,
including
consular planning and civil contingencies.
233.
At the FCO
Iraq Morning Meeting on 3 February, Mr Alan Charlton, FCO
Personnel
Director,
asked about military timing.112
Mr Ricketts
advised that “the newspapers weren’t
a bad
guide: ‘we need to have our preparations in place by end
Feb[ruary]’”.
234.
The same day,
Mr Ehrman reported to Mr Ricketts that the Pigott Group,
an
MOD‑led,
inter-departmental group of senior officials (see Section 6.4), had
decided
that there
was a need for a senior FCO official to co-ordinate full-time with
the MOD,
DFID and
others the rapidly increasing volume of work on aftermath
planning.113
235.
Mr Ehrman
suggested that “in addition to work on overall legality … we
will
need
sub-groups on WMD, OFF, SSR, humanitarian, reconstruction,
judicial, possibly
terrorism.
All this to feed into and influence the various aftermath groups in
Washington.”
236.
Mr Ricketts
informed Mr Chaplin on 4 February that he had agreed
with
Sir Michael Jay
and Mr Ehrman that:
“… the FCO
should consolidate the lead we have already taken in this area
[post-
conflict
issues] with the work that Dominick Chilcott has been doing under
your
supervision.
“I am sure
that this work will now grow fast, particularly with the prospect
of the
UK
inheriting responsibility for a good slice of southern Iraq
following a military
237.
Mr Bowen
chaired a meeting in the Cabinet Office on 4 February, attended
by
officials
from the FCO, the MOD and DFID, at which it was decided to set up
an inter-
departmental
(FCO, MOD and DFID) unit.115
The unit
would be headed by an FCO
official,
Mr Chilcott, to “prepare for the aftermath in practical
operational terms”. Wider
strategy
would continue to be co-ordinated through the AHGI.
112
Manuscript
comment Brewer, 3 February 2003, on Minute Tanfield to PS/PUS, 31
January 2003,
‘Iraq Morning
Meeting: Key Points’.
113
Minute
Ehrman to Ricketts, 3 February 2003, ‘Pigott Group, 3
February’.
114
Minute
Ricketts to Chaplin, 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After
Planning’.
115
Letter
Bowen to Ehrman, 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Operational Policy
Unit’.
351