17 |
Civilian casualties
25.
In October,
the JIC assessed the likely reaction of the Kurdish and Shia
population
of Iraq to
any US‑led attack.23
It stated
that:
“…
spontaneous
uprisings, without any
clear central leadership, are likely in both
southern
and northern Iraq … should the regime’s control collapse quickly …
In both
areas there
could be violent score settling.”
26.
In December,
the JIC assessed Iraq’s military options during Coalition air
strikes and
a ground
attack.24
Its Key
Judgements included:
“Saddam
[Hussein] would use chemical and biological weapons (CBW) if he
faced
defeat. He
might also use them earlier in a conflict, including against
coalition forces,
neighbouring
states and his own people. Israel could be his first
target.
…
“Other
Iraqi responses might include seizing hostages as ‘human shields’;
using
non‑lethal
BW agents in a deniable manner; suicide attacks; or a ‘scorched
earth’
policy with
the aim of creating a humanitarian or environmental catastrophe. At
some
point,
motivated by revenge, Saddam would seek to inflict the maximum
damage on
his
enemies, whether Iraqis or outsiders.”
27.
Sections 6.1
and 6.2 consider UK military planning for the invasion of Iraq,
including
the
development of the UK’s Targeting Directive.
28.
On 15 January
2003, Mr Blair met Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary,
the Chiefs
of Staff
and others to discuss military planning for Iraq.25
Mr Blair
asked how many
civilian
casualties there might be, and for a list of the targets which UK
air forces might
be asked to
attack, along with a commentary on their military importance and
the risk of
29.
On 3 February,
the MOD produced a Casualty Estimate paper for the Chiefs
of
Staff.27
The
estimates of UK military casualties are described in Section
16.3.
30.
The MOD
advised that, although detailed assessments of civilian
casualties
resulting
from the air campaign could be produced on a “target‑by‑target”
basis, the
target set
was not yet sufficiently well defined to allow an estimate to be
produced for
the air
campaign as a whole. Analysis based on estimated civilian
casualties during
operations
over Iraq between 1998 and 1999 suggested that the civilian
casualties for
an air
campaign would be around 150 killed and 500 injured.
23
JIC
Assessment, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq: The Kurds and
Shia’.
24
JIC
Assessment, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Options’.
25
Email
PJHQ‑DCJO(Ops)‑MA to PJHQ‑CJO/MA, 15 January 2003, ‘Readout of the
Brief to PM –
Wed 15 Jan’
.
26
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
27
Minute Fry
to COSSEC, 3 February 2003, ‘Casualty Estimates – Op TELIC’
attaching Paper MOD,
3 February
2003, ‘Casualty Estimates for Op TELIC Based on Operational
Analysis’.
177