4.4 | The
search for WMD
855.
Mr Phillipson
wrote that the US Government had rejected Mr Duelfer’s
argument
that it
should be sufficient to issue a disclaimer stating that naming
companies in the
Report was
not an indication of guilt or complicity; a published official CIA
report could
not mention
named US individuals or entities. The UK had pressed for the
exclusion of
all such
references, but the US position was that the legal restriction did
not apply to
non-US
entities. Presentationally, that approach was better than removing
only US and
UK names;
it emphasised that it was not the UK’s report.
856.
The other
issue still to be addressed was the withdrawal of intelligence
used
before the
invasion to support assessments about Iraqi WMD programmes. No.10
was
discussing
handling, including informing the ISC, with SIS.
857.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald and Dr Rice discussed the ISG Comprehensive Report
on
4 October.477
Sir Nigel
said that there had been good co-ordination between the US
and
UK. He set
out Mr Blair’s view on handling: the failure to find WMD
stockpiles it should
be
presented as “yesterday’s story” and the media should be encouraged
to focus on the
new
material about strategic intent, concealment and sanctions
busting.
858.
Mr Blair
raised the ISG Comprehensive Report with President Bush during a
video
conference
on 5 October.478
859.
Mr Blair’s
brief for the conversation suggested that he tell President Bush
that
the UK was
focusing on the positive aspects of the ISG Report rather than the
lack
860.
During his
wider discussion with President Bush on Iraq on 5 October
(see
Section 9.3),
Mr Blair stated that the ISG Report “showed that Saddam had a
clear
strategic
intent to develop WMD” and that “terrorists had now chosen to
make
Iraq the
battleground”.480
It would be
naive to say that Iraq had been stable and
non-threatening
before March 2003 and would still be so if no action had been
taken.
Mr Blair
concluded that:
“We needed
to focus on the fact that sanctions had not been working, Saddam
had
strategic
intent to rebuild his capability, and even if he had no deployable
weapons,
the
enforcement regime wasn’t working and Saddam was gearing up for
when it was
removed. We
had to focus on the whole story.”
861.
The ISG
Comprehensive Report was published on 6 October
2004.
477
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 4 October 2004, ‘Conversation with US
National Security Adviser,
4 October’.
478
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 5 October 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC
with President Bush, 5 October:
US
Elections, Iraq, Iran, MEPP’.
479
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 4 October 2004, ‘VTC with
President Bush, 5 October’.
480
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 5 October 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC
with President Bush, 5 October:
US
Elections, Iraq, Iran, MEPP’.
595