The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

702.  Mr Campbell added that despite five phone calls including the conference call, the

US and UK:

“… were not really in the same place. I could sense that Condi thought we were

weakening. She really didn’t like the final, final opportunity line, couldn’t see it was

simply a way of trying to show we preferred peace to war …”

703.  Mr Campbell told Dr Rice that she had to understand “we were hit hard here

because people felt we were rushing to a timetable set by others”.

704.  On 23 February, Mr Blair spoke to President Putin who was prepared to work

on a second resolution which put tougher requirements on Saddam Hussein, but

President Putin did not think it should provide an automatic start to hostilities.203

705.  Mr Blair also spoke to Mr Vicente Fox, the Mexican President,204 and

Mr Ricardo Lagos, the Chilean President.205

706.  Mr Straw and Sir David Manning also made a number of telephone calls.

707.  Mr Straw spoke to Mr de Villepin on 23 February about French concerns that

pushing for a second resolution was premature and indicated that the US and the UK

had no faith in the inspection process.206

708.  On 24 February, Mr Campbell wrote that “Iraq was totally dominating” and he had

suggested in Mr Blair’s morning meeting that “something concrete, like signs of Arab

pressure, or a new diplomatic effort that meant something” was “needed to add some

substance to the ‘last push for peace’, which at the moment just sounded vacuous”.207

Mr Blair “said the last push WAS the pressure being applied, or the pressure was the last

push”, which Mr Campbell “still felt looked like we were trying to meet a US timetable,

not genuinely trying to avoid war. But all the US politicians did was communicate an

impatience to get to war.”

Response to the draft resolution of 24 February 2003

709.  The UK, US and Spain tabled a draft resolution on 24 February stating simply

that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 and that

the Security Council had decided to remain seized of the matter.

203  Letter Hallam to McDonald, 23 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Putin’.

204  Letter Hallam to McDonald, 23 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Fox

of Mexico’.

205  Letter Hallam to McDonald, 23 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President

Lagos of Chile’.

206  Telegram 40 FCO London to Paris, 23 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Telephone Call

with French Foreign Minister, 23 February’.

207  Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:

Countdown to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

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