5 | Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003

142. In a meeting held at his request with No.10 officials on 19 December,

Lord Goldsmith was again told that he was not at that stage being asked for

advice; and that the UK was pushing for a second resolution.

143. Lord Goldsmith was also told that, when he was asked for advice, it would

be helpful if he were to discuss a draft with Mr Blair.

144. As requested by Lord Goldsmith, Ms Adams set up a meeting with Mr Powell.53

145. The meeting took place on 19 December.

146. A minute produced by Mr David Brummell, the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers

from August 2000 to November 2004, stated that Sir David Manning and Baroness

Sally Morgan, the No.10 Director of Political and Government Relations, were also

present, as well as Mr Powell, and that the meeting’s purpose was to provide Lord

Goldsmith “with an update on developments and likely timings for any future action,

rather than for the AG to provide specific legal advice”.54

147. Mr Brummell recorded that Mr Powell had sketched out three “possible scenarios”:

• “Saddam Hussein does something very stupid and the weapons inspectors

find some WMD, which leads to a UN … resolution finding material breach and

authorising the use of force.”

• “The inspectors catch out Saddam Hussein in some way but the response of

members of the Security Council is such that there is no second resolution.”

• “… [T]he US become frustrated with the UN process and decide to take military

action regardless, i.e. without UN support.”

148. Mr Brummell wrote that Mr Powell had commented:

• “if the US and UK were to decide that military action was justified, the British

Cabinet would be unanimous in their support”;

• “There would be no question of the UK supporting military action” in the third

scenario; and “it was unlikely that the US would proceed” in the “absence of UK

support”; and

• military action could start as early as mid-February.

149. Mr Brummell reported that Sir David Manning had confirmed that the UK was

pushing for a second resolution and he thought there was a “reasonably good prospect

(i.e. a 50:50 or so chance)” of success. Iraq had also made the “mistake of alienating

Russia” by cancelling an oil contract which “would change the political weather”.

53 Minute Adams to Attorney General, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Interpretation of Resolution 1441’.

54 Minute Brummell, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Note of Meeting at No. 10 Downing Street – 4.00 pm,

19 December 2002’.

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