3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
139.
Dr ElBaradei
told Mr Blair:
“Not all
members agreed with the US timing … Iraq was not co-operating.
Unless
there were
clear signs of an Iraqi change of heart on co-operation, (both
process,
including
interviews, and substance), UNSCR 1441 would have to be
implemented.
Not
allowing interviews was a lack of full co-operation … dribbling out
concessions
was not
full co-operation … His 14 February report would be a clear as
possible.”
140.
In
Dr ElBaradei’s view, CBW was the key.
141.
On nuclear
issues, the inspectors continued to assess the aluminium
tubes.
Reports of
the possible import of uranium were: “Much more disturbing … There
could
only be one
reason for such an import.”
142.
Dr ElBaradei
told Mr Blair:
“If
satisfactory co-operation was not forthcoming, the next best
outcome would
be to force
Saddam … out … [He] did not oppose more time for inspections.
Any
war would
risk radicalising the region. It should be UN-controlled. As should
the
future Iraq
…”
143.
The No.10
record stated that Mr Blair had made clear to both
Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei
“the importance of putting Iraqis on the spot with some sharp
questions,
to show
whether they were co-operating fully or not”. He had “also
emphasised the
importance
of interviews”.
144.
In
Mr Blair’s view: “Our best chance of avoiding war was a clear
verdict from the
inspectors
followed by a massive international effort to get Saddam to
go.”
145.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Mr Blair had told Dr ElBaradei
that:
“… we had
to sort out Saddam in as peaceful way as possible, but above all
sort out
MEPP.
Saddam’s duty was one hundred per cent co-operation, not hide and
seek …
[I]f there
was a breach, there would be second resolution and then we could
build
pressure on
him to go.”35
146.
Mr Campbell
also wrote that Dr ElBaradei:
•
had said
the Iraqis claimed they never tried to get uranium but it wasn’t
true;
•
did not
think many tears would be shed in the Arab world if Saddam
went;
•
was worried
that Iraq would claim it was being attacked not because of
weapons
but because
they were a Muslim country;
•
felt it
would be better if Mr Blair and President Bush could say it
was part
of a vision
of a zone free of nuclear weapons;
35
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
203