4 | Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction

26. The first official definition was provided by the UN Commission for Conventional

Armaments in 1948 which defined weapons of mass destruction as “atomic explosive

devices, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any

weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive

effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above”.9 This definition

has been used in successive UN resolutions dealing with disarmament.

27. The Butler Report pointed out that there was “a considerable and long-standing

academic debate about the proper interpretation of the phrase ‘weapons of mass

destruction’” which had been “used so variously as to confuse rather than enlighten

readers”.10 The Butler Report avoided the use of the term WMD wherever possible.

Where it was used, for example when quoting documents or evidence, the Butler Report

interpreted it in the light of the obligations imposed by the UN Security Council after

the 1990 to 1991 Gulf Conflict to address the threat posed by Iraq and to control Iraq’s

military capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in

resolution 687 (1991) (see Section 1.1).

28. The Inquiry shares the view expressed in the Butler Report but recognises that

the term has gained common currency and may, therefore, appear in the analysis

that follows as a shorthand description of weapons that would not fall within the

original definition.

29. All nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are frequently characterised as

weapons of mass destruction, and radiological devices have been included

more recently.

30. The Butler Report defined radiological weapons as those employing “conventional,

typically high-explosive means to distribute radioactive material”.11

31. Systems that fall within the definition of WMD may cause limited casualties within

a finite area; for example attacks such as the use of the chemical agent sarin in the

Tokyo underground. On the other hand, as the attacks on the US on 11 September

2001 demonstrated, mass casualties that have a strategic impact can be produced in

other ways.

32. Mr Tim Dowse, Head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

Non‑Proliferation Department from January 2001 to November 2003, told the Inquiry

that “efforts to restrain the spread of ballistic missiles” tended to be “associated with”

weapons of mass destruction because they provided a means of delivery against which

it was difficult to defend and which was regarded as “quite destabilising”.12

9 UN Document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948.

10 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 14.

11 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 17.

12 Public hearing, 25 November 2009, page 4.

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