10.3 | Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and stabilisation policy

861. Establishing a programme to enable the return of Iraqi asylum seekers currently in

the UK to Iraq was an early priority for the UK Government.

862. On 8 April 2003, as major combat operations in Iraq continued, Mr David Blunkett,

the Home Secretary, wrote to Mr Blair:

“As the conflict in Iraq moves towards a successful conclusion, we need to look at

the consequences for the tens of thousands of Iraqi asylum seekers currently in the

United Kingdom.

“Once peace and stability have returned to Iraq I believe it is right to press ahead

with a substantial returns programme … The new Iraq needs the skills of its exiles

to help in reconstruction. And with the threat from Saddam’s regime removed

there is no justification for failed Iraqi asylum seekers and new arrivals to remain

in the UK.”539

863. No.10 replied on 10 April, confirming that Mr Blair had asked departments to work

towards “forced returns … in the course of the next three months”.540

864. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) facilitated a small number of

voluntary returns from the UK to Iraq, beginning in June 2003.541

865. The Home Office reported in October 2003 that 50 Iraqis had so far returned

on that basis.542

866. In October 2003, the UK sought the CPA’s agreement to expand its voluntary

returns programme and to introduce an enforced returns programme, to the Kurdish

Autonomous Zone (KAZ) only, for those who had no legal right to remain in the UK.543

867. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq,

reported on 7 November that the CPA was reluctant to agree those requests.544

Ambassador Paul Bremer, the Head of the CPA, had decided in July not to encourage

returnees until Iraq’s infrastructure could deal with them. The CPA argued that while the

KAZ was a more stable and better serviced area of Iraq:

• there were already more than 600,000 internally displaced people there;

• the ethnic balance remained sensitive;

• there was not yet a policy on resolving disputes over property ownership; and

539 Letter Blunkett to Blair, 8 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Organising Rapid Returns’.

540 Letter Miles to Razavi, 10 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Organising Rapid Returns’.

541 Minute Baird to Hughes, 6 June 2003, ‘Returns to Iraq: Update’.

542 Letter Baird to Fry, 16 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Return of Failed Asylum Seekers’ attaching Paper,

[undated], ‘Iraq: Returns’.

543 Letter Baird to Fry, 16 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Return of Failed Asylum Seekers’ attaching Paper,

[undated], ‘Iraq: Returns’.

544 Telegram 255 Baghdad to FCO London, 7 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Iraqi Returns’.

503