The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

381. Dr Rice gave a similar account of the 7 September NSC meeting in her memoir:

“The President had decided on a policy of coercive diplomacy. He would give

Saddam a chance to respond to the united pressure of the international community,

and the build‑up of US forces would make that pressure credible … One way or

another, the threat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq would finally be removed.”122

382. Dr Rice further commented:

“Some people have claimed that the President never asked his advisors whether

he should go to war against Saddam. At that September meeting … the National

Security Council, after a full and frank discussion, decided on a course of action.

Everyone in that room heard the President say: ‘Either he will come clean about his

weapons, or there will be war.’ There was no disagreement. The way ahead could

not have been clearer.”

383. Vice President Cheney wrote that he had been a strong advocate of using

President Bush’s speech to “challenge the UN”, to “confront” it and “hold the

organization accountable”, making clear that “if the Security Council was unwilling to

impose consequences for violations, the UN would become irrelevant”.123 He did not

want “yet one more meaningless resolution”.

384. Vice President Cheney also wrote that President Bush:

“… had not yet made a decision, but in neither this meeting nor any other I attended

did any of the President’s advisors argue against using military force to remove

Saddam … Nor did anyone argue that leaving Saddam in power, with all the risks

and costs associated with that course, was a viable option.”

385. Mr Tenet wrote in his memoir:

“Colin Powell was firmly on the side of going the extra mile with the UN. The

Vice President argued just as forcefully that doing so would only get us mired in

a bureaucratic tangle with nothing to show for it other than time lost off a ticking

clock … To me, the President still appeared less inclined to go to war than many of

his senior aides.”124

386. In a press conference before the discussions at Camp David, Mr Blair stated

that Iraq had to be dealt with; the purpose of the meeting with President Bush was

to work out the strategy.

387. President Bush and Mr Blair gave a press conference before their meeting.

122 Rice C. No Higher Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. Simon & Schuster, 2011.

123 Cheney D & Cheney L. In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir. Simon & Schuster, 2011.

124 Tenet G & Harlow B. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. HarperPress, 2007.

160