The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
738.
Mr Blair’s
initial view of the draft was that it was:
“… better
than expected. The whereabouts of the physical evidence
remained
unresolved.
But an unbiased reader could only conclude that Saddam had been
in
breach of
SCRs and that he was involved in highly suspicious
activities.”
739.
In discussion
of the detailed text, the following points were
identified:
•
Mr Blair
thought the section on procurement needed more detail and
clarity.
•
Mr Scarlett
thought the points on Iraq’s nuclear activities were “too firm”.
The
report
“needed to point out the possible non-nuclear dual use potential
for some
of this
equipment”.
•
Mr Blair
“wanted background explanations on ‘dual use goods’: the regime
had
gone to
elaborate lengths to obtain material allegedly for fertiliser or
insecticide
production
and the suspicious nature of this should be picked
up”.
•
The report
should make clear that “deception and concealment
operations
continued
right up to the outbreak of the conflict” and ask “why such
elaborate
deception
was needed if there was nothing to hide”.
•
The need to
“underline that Blix had been systematically hindered”,
including
over
interviews with scientists.
•
“Quotations
from interviewees would add verisimilitude to the
report.”
•
“We should
underline the deliberate destruction of evidence and sanitisation
of
sites eg
repairing of buildings during the conflict.”
•
There
should be more material on Korean missile technology.
740.
Mr Scarlett
said that the interim report would “flag up problems over eg the
alleged
BW mobile
laboratories and the unexpected absence of battlefield
CW”.
741.
Mr Blair
concluded that Mr Duelfer “needed to be clear about the ‘top
line’ of his
report”.
Based on the draft, that was that Saddam Hussein:
“(a) had
been in clear breach of SCRs and (b) his behaviour raised
immense
suspicions,
even if we had yet to pin down the exact nature of his machinations
…
[T]here
could be no question of influencing the material that appeared in
the report.
But it was
important that, as a document, it held together as a logical,
coherent and
well-documented
whole.”
742.
Mr Scarlett
discussed the ISG report in a video conference with
Mr Duelfer,
Maj Gen
Dayton and the CIA on 18 March.412
743.
Mr Scarlett
told Sir Nigel Sheinwald that Mr Duelfer felt the report would
need to
be “heavily
sanitised” to avoid public exposure of operational details of lines
of enquiry
412
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 18 March 2004, ‘ISG’.
568