3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
274.
Mr John
Grainger, an FCO Legal Counsellor in the Middle East Department,
wrote
a minute on
27 November, which briefly set out the history of the use of force
against
Iraq and
the legal basis for it.137
He
emphasised that there had not been any significant
decision by
the Security Council since 1998 and that caution should be
exercised about
relying
upon that decision after the expiry of such a long time. Mr
Grainger advised that
the UK
should take a cautious line in relation to the latest US
statements.
275.
Sir Michael
Wood, the FCO Legal Adviser from 1999 to 2006, told the
Inquiry
that the
legality of the use of military force against Iraq had been raised
as early as
November
2001 “when President Bush made some kind of statement, which
made
it look
as though force might be used. So we set out the position
immediately.”138
276.
In response
to a request from Mr Blair for advice on the options for
dealing
with Iraq,
the FCO proposed “ratcheting up” the policy of containment,
including
pressing
Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations and making
the
“red‑lines
for military action more specific”.
277.
The FCO
warned that the UK could be confronted with an
unwelcome
dilemma of
supporting unlawful and widely unpopular action or distancing
itself
from a key
US policy.
278.
A visit to
Washington by Sir David Manning would be an opportunity to
find
out what
the US was thinking and “test the viability of any
plans”.
279.
In relation
to Iraq’s possession of WMD, the FCO letter did not fully
reflect
the caveats
which the JIC had attached to its Assessments.
280.
Mr McDonald
wrote to No.10 on 3 December:
“In advance
of David Manning’s trip to Washington on Wednesday the
Prime
Minister
has asked for a note on the options for dealing with
Iraq.”139
“US hawks,
especially in the Pentagon, are talking up the possibility of
military action
against
Iraq and of trying to topple Saddam Hussein (regime-change). That
would
confront us
with an unwelcome dilemma: support unlawful and widely
unpopular
action or
distance ourselves from a key US policy. Decisions have not yet
been
taken in
Washington: we need to influence the debate.”
282.
Mr McDonald
added that there were:
“… no
anti-terrorist grounds for Stage 2 military action against Iraq
…”
137
Minute
Grainger to Tanfield, 27 November 2001, ‘Iraq: Comments by
President Bush on WMD’.
138
Public
hearing, 26 January 2010, pages 14-15.
139
Letter
McDonald to Tatham, 3 December 2001, ‘Iraq: Options’.
359