4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
782.
Addressing the
question “Why Saddam?”, Mr Rycroft wrote:
“Need to
tackle WMD around the world. Have different strategies for N Korea,
Libya
etc. With
these countries there are at least … some ways of dealing
diplomatically
with them.
Not possible with Saddam’s Iraq. Only Saddam has (a) record of
WMD
use, (b)
violated so many UN obligations.”
783.
Mr Rycroft
also wrote:
•
“The
country [Iraq], region and world would be better off without
Saddam, but the
issue is
his WMD. He must disarm …”
•
There was:
“No known link between Saddam and Al Qaida. Terrorism is not
the
issue – WMD
is.”
784.
The background
documents included a FCO letter providing material to
answer
points made
in the debate.429
In relation
to Iraq’s possession of WMD and the risk of
proliferation,
the brief on military action stated:
•
“… as
dossier clearly sets out, Iraqi regime has accelerated its
weapons
programmes
since departure of inspectors. Saddam should be in no doubt
about
our
determination to remove the threat of his WMD.”
•
“What
singles out Iraq as a proliferator is Saddam’s demonstrated
willingness to
use WMD and
wage war against his neighbours. Naive to suppose that we
could
persuade
Saddam through dialogue to give up his weapons …”
•
“In cases
of other proliferators [Iran, North Korea and Libya], we have
tried
to address
our concerns through dialogue … even though some people
have
criticised
us for this.”
785.
The detailed
briefing on WMD stated that:
•
Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction and was “still hiding” them
“in
a range of
locations”. The regime had admitted “hiding chemical,
biological
weapons and
missile parts”.
•
The UK
believed Iraq had “the capability to deliver these weapons to a
range
of locations”.
•
Iraq had
“admitted producing large quantities of chemical warfare agents”
and
“producing
biological warfare agents”.
•
UN weapons
inspectors had been “unable to account for thousands of
tonnes
of
so-called precursor chemicals used in the production of weapons;
hundreds
of tonnes
of precursor chemicals used in the production of VX nerve
agent;
and tens of
thousands of special munitions which can be used in chemical
and
biological
weapons”.
429
Letter
Sedwill to Rycroft, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Commons Debate:
Supplementaries’.
265