The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
idea of
extending the UK Area of Operations north during the conflict
phase.
If that was
required to achieve a satisfactory conclusion to Phase III, on
which
“an
exemplary Phase IV depends”.
•
Third, the
UK “should be prepared to continue exploring options for
reinforcing
US forces
at decisive points … but without commitment at this
stage”.
601.
Mr Hoon spoke
to Secretary Rumsfeld that evening, setting out the risks to
starting
operations
at the time of a full moon and the political implications of not
giving the
second
resolution sufficient time to secure votes (see Section
3.8).201
602.
The MOD
reported that Secretary Rumsfeld had said Gen Franks was looking
at
how to
“work around” a position in which the UK could not participate in
military action
but which
assumed that the UK would be available for post-conflict
activities. Mr Hoon
had
responded that the UK would not want to be in that position and
restated the case
for waiting
a few more days.
603.
In a
subsequent press briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld said that it was
unclear what
the UK role
would be in the event that a decision was made to use force: “until
we know
what the
resolution is, we won’t know the answer to what their role will
be”.202
604.
Secretary
Rumsfeld subsequently clarified his comments, saying that he had
“no
doubt of
the full support of the United Kingdom for the international
community’s efforts
to disarm
Iraq”.203
Obtaining a
second resolution was important to the UK and the US
was
“working to achieve that”. He added:
“In the
event that a decision to use force is made, we have every reason to
believe
that there
will be a significant military contribution from the United
Kingdom.”
605.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote that Secretary Rumsfeld had been “trying to
be
helpful”,
but it had not helped and “by then the military were absolutely
determined,
rightly,
that they would be part of the action from the outset, and took
amiss any sense
that we
might be in the second rank”.204
606.
In the entry
for 11 March in the edition of his diaries published in
2012,
Mr Campbell
wrote that the incident was “indicative of the difficulties” of
working with the
US.205
Secretary
Rumsfeld’s clarification was the result of a further telephone call
from
Mr Hoon
“making it clear that we were with them”.
201
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Call to Donald
Rumsfeld’.
202
US
Department of Defense, 11 March 2003, ‘DoD New Briefing – Secretary
Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers’.
203
BBC
News, 12 March
2003, Text of
Donald Rumsfeld remarks.
204
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
205
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
482