The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Section 6:
What is the current situation concerning Iraq’s WMD
programmes?
Account of
his … capabilities. New procurement activity and retention
of
experts.
Use of illicit funding and circumvention of ‘Oil-for-Food’
arrangements.
What is the
threat posed by Iraq’s on-going WMD programmes? [Action:
Assessments Staff]
•
Section 7:
Why we cannot continue to rely on containment and why we
should
act now.
Future intentions. [Action:
FCO/MED]”97
211.
Mr Miller
wrote that much of the work was seen as “cutting and pasting”
existing
material,
and that the Communications and Information Centre (CIC) had
“offered to …
co-ordinate
the various inputs and produce a revised draft of the dossier”.
That would
be discussed
at a meeting on 10 September.
212.
Mr Sebastian
Wood, Counsellor, British Embassy Washington, wrote
that
Mr Scarlett
had told him:
•
Mr Blair
wanted the paper on “what Saddam has been doing since 1998
and
how we
currently assess his WMD programmes” to be “as intelligence-rich
and
convincing
in detail as possible”, and Mr Scarlett expected to be “able
to ‘break
out’ some
current intelligence”.
•
Mr Scarlett
would come to Washington with a draft and Sir David
Manning
wanted the
Embassy to tell the US that Mr Scarlett had been
“designated”
by Mr Blair
to take the dossier forward”.98
213.
Mr Williams
suggested revising the “capping piece” for the draft
dossier.
214.
On 5
September, Mr Williams sent Mr McKane a revised version
of the draft
capping
piece for the dossier, which he described as offering “suggestions”
on how it
might be
amended to “make the document easier for Ministers to defend in
interviews”.99
215.
Mr Williams’
changes included reference to Saddam Hussein’s regime
being
“uniquely”
dangerous and that it had a “capacity for aggression”. He also
described
the material
in the dossier as “our best
publishable assessment” of the
facts.
216.
Mr McKane
told the Inquiry that his only recollection of an exchange
with
Mr Williams
on the dossier was of his comments on the draft capping note “which
were
designed …
to improve the draft and make … it read better”.100
217.
Mr McKane
stated that his draft was “overtaken by the decision to
move
responsibility”
for the dossier, from OD Sec to the Assessments Staff when it
was
decided
that it would be “more overtly an intelligence-based
document”.101
97
Letter
Miller to Grey [sic], 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Public
Dossier’.
98
Minute Wood
to Gooderham, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Dossier: Scarlett’s
Visit’.
99
Minute
Williams to McKane, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq: The
Dossier’.
100
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 81.
101
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, pages 82-83.
152