9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
27.
After visiting
Iraq in early May 2003, General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the
General
Staff,
observed:
“A security
vacuum still exists [in Baghdad] … particularly at night.
Looting,
revenge
killing and subversive activities are rife … Should a bloody and
protracted
insurgency
establish itself in Baghdad, then a ripple effect is likely to
occur.”9
28.
Gen Jackson
recognised that the UK’s ability to maintain the consent of
the
population
in the South depended on a stable and secure Baghdad, and
advised:
“The bottom
line is that if we choose not to influence Baghdad we must be
confident
of the US
ability to improve [its tactics] before tolerance is lost and
insurgency
sets in.”
29.
Gen Jackson,
Major General David Richards (Assistant Chief of the
General
Staff) and
Lieutenant General Sir Anthony Pigott (Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff
(Commitments))
all offered advice in favour of deploying the UK’s 16 Air Assault
Brigade
to Baghdad
to support Coalition efforts to retrain Iraqi police officers and
get them back
on
patrol.
30.
However, the
Chiefs of Staff collectively considered that the benefits of
making
a
contribution to the security of Baghdad were outweighed by the risk
that UK troops
would be
“tied down” outside the UK’s Area of Responsibility, with adverse
impact, and
advised on
21 May against deploying 16 Air Assault Brigade. The Chiefs of
Staff did not
conclude
that the tasks it was proposed that 16 Air Assault Brigade should
undertake
were
unnecessary, but rather that US troops would complete
them.
31.
On 21 March
2003, the day after the start of the invasion, Mr Jonathan
Powell
and Sir
David Manning, two of Mr Blair’s closest advisers, offered him
advice on how
to
influence the post-invasion US agenda. Key among their concerns was
the need
for
post-conflict administrative arrangements to have the legitimacy
conferred by UN
endorsement.
Such UK plans for the post-conflict period as had been
developed
relied on
the deployment of an international reconstruction effort to Iraq.
Controversy
surrounding
the launch of the invasion made that challenging to deliver; the
absence
of UN
endorsement would make it close to impossible.
32.
Discussion
between the US and UK on the content of a new UN Security
Council
resolution
began the same day. Resolution 1483 (2003) was eventually adopted
on
22 May.
9
Minute CGS
to CDS, 13 May 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op. TELIC 7-10 May
2003’.
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