The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
494.
The 30 July
advice and the response are addressed in Section 6.3.
495.
Responding to
a request from MOD officials for urgent approval to widen
the
group
involved in contingency planning to improve the estimates of the
time and costs
of
enhancements likely to be needed to support military operations,
Mr Hoon concluded
that that
would be premature.207
496.
On 30 July, in
a meeting with Adm Boyce, Sir Kevin Tebbit,
Lt Gen Pigott and
Mr Bowen,
Mr Hoon discussed the line that Maj Gen Wilson
should take in the
CENTCOM
meeting the following day.208
497.
Mr Hoon
acknowledged that “striking the right tone and balance … was
difficult.
Ministers
would wish the SBMA [Maj Gen Wilson] to be positive
without, at this stage,
committing
the UK to any specific contribution”. The draft provided by PJHQ on
the
northern
option “risked over committing us”.
498.
Mr Hoon
concluded that Maj Gen Wilson should warn the US of the
political
difficulty
created by the need, in “the absence of pre‑positioned assets”, for
a move of
UK armour
to Turkey, which “would have to take place early and be very
visible”.
499.
After
considerable debate, an agreed text was sent to
Maj Gen Wilson on
1 August,
and forwarded to Mr Hoon’s Office for
information.209
500.
Maj Gen Wilson’s
address emphasised that the UK fully understood and
sympathised
“with the US position on Iraq, and Saddam Hussein”, and shared
US
“concerns
about leaving him to develop his WMD aspirations” and the potential
threat he
posed.210
The UK was
“deeply appreciative of the opportunity to … contribute
towards
the US …
planning process” and had been “working hard to identify forces”
that could
“in
principle” be made available to support the US plan. But he was
“bound to reiterate”
that the UK
had “made no decision in favour of action in Iraq” beyond its
involvement in
enforcing
the No‑Fly Zones.
501.
Maj Gen Wilson
offered “observations” on the US plan, including:
•
The UK
would be able to build on existing activity and be in support of
the US
“from Day
One”. The “fullest possible deployment of maritime, air and SF”
could
be
operational “relatively quickly”.
•
In relation
to land options in the South, “once the logistic in‑load has begun”
it
was “going
to be very busy in the South”. While it would be “wrong” to make
“any
definitive
judgements” until planning was complete, it was difficult to see
how the
207
Minute
Watkins to Sec(O)1a, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq – Enhancements Required
for Possible
UK Contribution’.
208
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 30 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
209
Email
PJHQ‑J9‑Hd(Pol/Ops)(s) to SOFS‑Private Office, 01 Aug 2002,
‘CENTCOM Iraq Planning – A UK
Perspective’.
210
Paper
Wilson, [1 August 2002], ‘CENTCOM Iraq Planning – A UK
Perspective’.
250