6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
“The
proposed final [UK] Area of Responsibility is a coherent one with
largely
natural
geographical boundaries … and includes economic infrastructure
critical to
Iraq’s
future, including much of its oil reserves, critical communications
nodes, a
city
(Basra) of 1.3 million people and a port (Umm Qasr) the size of
Southampton.
Although
the establishment of UK control over this area will require
careful
presentation
to rebut any allegations of selfish motives, we will be playing a
vital role
in shaping
a better future for Iraq and its people.”
203.
Map 3 in Annex
4 of the Report shows the proposed AOR and the effect
of
subsequent
decisions to expand.
204.
Commenting on
the point, originally made in the letter from his Private Office
to
Sir David
Manning on 8 January, that the UK’s proposed role would “make us
even more
important
to the US plan than we were before”, Mr Hoon wrote that
was:
“… to some
extent a double-edged sword. By making us more integral to the
US
plan, it
would add to the difficulties if US and UK intentions should
diverge. But this
is a
sharpening of an existing risk – bearing in mind US reliance on
Diego Garcia,
for
instance – rather than the creation of a new one.”
205.
Mr Hoon wrote
that Mr Blair had identified three big issues in the discussion
the
previous
day:
•
the “nature
of the proposition” that was being put “to the Iraqi people
including
those in
the governing apparatus who are not considered beyond the pale,
and
the way in
which that would be conveyed to them without damaging
operational
security
and losing the element of surprise”;
•
the need
“now that we have a proposed Area of Responsibility” to work on
that
“with
greater clarity”. The forthcoming visit of a Whitehall team to
Washington
(see
Section 6.5) was identified as “an opportunity to mould US
thinking”; and
•
making sure
the UK had the “best possible contingency plans for
worst-case
scenarios”.
206.
Mr Hoon said
he had put work in hand to address those issues.
207.
Mr Hoon set
out the latest estimates for the costs of military operations and
the
actions and
timetable for implementation:
“CENTCOM
assume that, unless Saddam changes his behaviour, a political
decision
to take
military action may be made in mid-February. Air and ground
operations
could begin
in early March, with the main effort by ground forces beginning
in
mid- March
(although they still aspire to bring the main effort
forward).”
208.
The UK
headquarters would need to be “deployed and readied in Kuwait …
by
the end of
January, 16 Air Assault Brigade by the beginning of March, and 7
Armoured
415