6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
328.
Maj Gen Fry
invited the Chiefs to note that:
•
The US
intended the immediate post-conflict stabilisation period to last
between
three and
six months: “By necessity and tactical imperative there is implicit
UK
acceptance
of this direction.”
•
US thinking
on the recovery phase, expected to last up to two years,
was
evolving
and could be shaped by the UK: “The UK has a
comprehensive
network of
embedded staff who need clear direction if they are to meet
UK
intent.”
•
It was not
clear where the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) responsible
for
security
sector issues from the start of the recovery period would be
found:
“A UK view
on the potential role of HQ ARRC [Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps]
is required.”
•
Boundaries
within Iraq would change with the transition from stabilisation
to
recovery:
“If the UK wish to retain Sector South East a clear message needs
to
be sent to
CFC [Coalition Forces Commander, Gen Franks].”
•
The US
assumed continued UK two-star leadership and
“prolonged
commitment”
of a brigade. The duration of the UK’s commitment
needed
clarification.
•
The US
needed to take critical decisions about UN involvement
soon.
329.
Maj Gen Fry
explained that US planning was evolving slowly because
of
disagreement
between DoD and the State Department over governance and
the
primacy of
CFLCC, JTF-4 and the “Iraq Office of Post-war Planning [ORHA]”. The
UK
had a
colonel and small team in CFLCC “with the lead on the stabilisation
stage” and a
colonel
with a small team in JTF-4 “with a focus on the recovery stage”.
Maj Gen Cross
would
deploy to ORHA with a small team shortly. To exert influence, there
needed to be
a common UK
approach to the issues, which was “currently lacking”. The IPU had
been
tasked to
take that work forward.
330.
Under existing
US plans, once “post-hostility conditions” were achieved,
CJTF
would take
over from CFLCC as the military headquarters responsible for Phase
IV, but
a decision
was still needed on CJTF’s “parentage”. One option was to deploy
the ARRC
to take
over as CJTF Iraq, incorporating JTF-4.
331.
The paper
described key tasks for the stabilisation phase, but offered
no
assessment
of troop numbers needed to perform them.
332.
The first
detailed estimate of the type (but not the size) of force required
to deliver
different
tasks was in Lt Gen Reith’s draft Concept of Operations for Phase
IV on
25 March.
367