The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
de‑Ba’athification
Law; it was for the IECI to determine eligibility, accepting or
rejecting
the
de‑Ba’athification Commission’s recommendation as they saw
fit.
226.
Mr Patey
subsequently briefed the UN Special Representative and the
IECI
International
Commissioner on his meeting with Dr Chalabi. They explained
that the
IECI was in
some difficulty since it had to be seen to be acting in accordance
with
Iraqi law:
CPA Order No.1 and the Electoral Law both said that anyone covered
by
de‑Ba’athification
could not stand for election. The IECI therefore had little choice
but
to accept
the de‑Ba’athification Commission’s recommendations.
227.
By 1 December,
the number of individuals recommended for
disqualification
by the
de‑Ba’athification Commission had risen to 134.184
228.
A message from
the IPU setting out Iraq policy priorities for the week
ahead
recorded
that Mr Straw had raised de‑Ba’athification with Secretary
Rice.185
They
had
agreed that
the de‑Ba’athification Commission was “acting in a way which ran
entirely
counter to
our efforts on outreach” and that they would lobby Dr Chalabi
in his capacity
as Chairman
of the Commission.
229.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald raised UK concerns that de‑Ba’athification might disrupt
the
elections
with Mr Stephen Hadley, the US National Security Advisor, on 2
December.186
Sir Nigel
said: “It would be much better to leave this until after the
election and decide
then
whether anyone should be prevented from taking up their seat
because their
background
infringed the Constitution.” He suggested that it would be helpful
for the
US to
talk to Dr Chalabi.
230.
On 5 December,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told Mr Blair:
“We are
working with the US to reverse a decision by the
de‑Ba’athification
Commission
to bar a number of former Ba’athists (both Shia and Sunni)
from
standing in
the election … It looks like a brazenly partisan move, and
deeply
231.
In a
conversation with President Bush the same day, Mr Blair
suggested that the
US and UK
needed to keep a close eye on the actions of the outgoing
Government,
including
the de‑Ba’athification Commission.188
184
eGram
19784/05 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 1 December 2005, ‘Iraq:
UK‑US‑UN Trilateral:
1 December’.
185
eGram
19874/05 FCO London to Baghdad, 2 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Policy
Priorities for the Week
Beginning
Saturday 3 December’.
186
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 2 December 2005, ‘Conversation with US National
Security Adviser,
2 December’.
187
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 5 December 2005, ‘VTC with President
Bush, 1425 5 December’.
188
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 5 December 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush: Middle East’.
44