The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

616.  Despite that judgement, Lt Gen Fry had identified that the ING could be provided

with more firepower, mobility and logistic support. To do that, Mr Naworynsky listed six

proposals at an estimated total cost of US$107m. He wrote that those proposals would

“accelerate the development of capable ISF” but were “costly and unfunded” with no

provision for meeting them within the MOD’s budget. He concluded by pointing out that

“even if all this is done, the impact on Iraqi capability for high end counter‑insurgency

operations before elections will remain very limited”. It would, however, “give a highly

visible Iraqi face to such operations which would be at least as important in perception

terms as the military effect achieved”.

617.  Mr Quarrey summarised the MOD’s proposals to Mr Blair as “effectively brush[ing]

aside Allawi’s demands”.554 He accepted that there was logic in the proposals but the

focus on ING instead of the main counter‑insurgency forces would not deliver what

Allawi “really wants”. He advised Mr Blair to speak to Mr Hoon, “emphasising the need

for him to take a personal interest in the issue”.

618.  Referring to the MOD’s proposals, Mr Blair responded: “It may be right but it’s

definitely not a response to Allawi.”555

619.  On 5 October, Dr Allawi wrote a letter to President Bush and Mr Blair.556 The Inquiry

has not seen this letter.

620.  On the same day, Mr Blair and President Bush spoke by video conference.557

Mr Blair’s brief for the conversation suggested that he should ask the President if there

had been progress on accelerating Iraqiisation; Secretary Rumsfeld was believed to be

resisting such a move.558

621.  In discussion, Mr Blair said that Prime Minister Allawi was pushing ahead with

Iraqiisation as fast as he could. Mr Blair suggested that Dr Allawi’s “twin track of political

outreach and increased military capability” plus a statement from the US and UK that

they were “in this until the job was done”, was “key”.559

622.  Mr Blair and Prime Minister Allawi spoke on 22 October.560 Mr Quarrey recorded

that Dr Allawi said that Iraqiisation was “finally moving” and that “people – even including

Rumsfeld – now accepted that Allawi was right about the need to accelerate this”.

Dr Allawi was expecting a detailed plan the following week.

554  Minute Quarrey to Blair, 1 October 2004, ‘Iraqi‑isation’.

555  Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Quarrey to Blair, 1 October 2004, ‘Iraqi‑isation’.

556  Letter Adams to Quarrey, 22 October 2004, ‘Prime Minister Allawi’s Letter on Developing ISF

Capability’.

557  Letter Phillipson to Adams, 5 October 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 5 October:

US Elections, Iraq, Iran, MEPP’.

558  Minute Phillipson to Prime Minister, 4 October 2004, ‘VTC with President Bush, 5 October’.

559  Letter Phillipson to Adams, 5 October 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 5 October:

US elections, Iraq, Iran, MEPP’.

560  Letter Quarrey to Wilson, 22 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Allawi,

22 October’.

190