The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
If the US
accepted the idea, Russia and China would reject it: “They
would
see it as a
precursor to military action. The US might be able to win over
the
Russians …
The Chinese might then follow.”
•
France
would still need “to be brought on board”. It would be “highly
suspicious
if they
thought the purpose of an ultimatum was to legitimise military
action rather
than get
the inspectors in”.
•
If the US
“refused outright to countenance” a resolution with an ultimatum,
or
the US and
UK “failed to persuade” other Permanent Members, “there might
be
merit … in
a bilateral US/UK ultimatum on the model used before the start
of
hostilities
in Afghanistan”. That “might be a useful manifesto of our aims …
with
sceptical
governments and public opinion. But it would have no legal
force.”
•
There were
risks. Opponents might table a resolution condemning an
ultimatum,
arguing
that as the US and UK would not be “claiming
to be
acting in self-
defence
under Article 51 of the UN Charter (as we were in Afghanistan)”,
an
ultimatum
“would amount to a threat of a use of force, breaching Article
2(4),
which
prohibits this”. The UK might find itself “having to veto [such a
resolution],
leaving us
worse off than if we had not tried this route at all”.
•
An
“essential first step would be to sound out the Americans” on which
the FCO
was “now
putting action in hand”.
396.
The letter
stated that the FCO was reconsidering additional UN routes to
put
pressure on
Iraq – travel bans, new measures to screen Iraq’s borders. While
such
proposals
were “likely to fail”, they would “help us demonstrate that we have
tried to
use the
UN route … if they succeeded, we would benefit from increased
pressure on the
Iraqi
regime. We would also buy time.”
397.
The FCO was
“giving further thought to what more we might be able to do
to
convince
the Security Council, European Union and other governments that
Saddam
represents
a clear and present danger. The Cabinet Office paper [the draft
‘dossier’
on Iraq]
when the right time comes for its release, will clearly be an
important element
of this.”
398.
A copy of the
FCO letter was sent to the Private Offices of Mr Hoon and
the
Cabinet
Secretary, and to Mr Scarlett.
399.
It was not
sent to Lord Goldsmith.
400.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell discussed developments on 26 July
and
agreed to
meet in August.
401.
Mr Straw
sent Mr Blair a personal, handwritten letter setting out his
concerns
which he
framed in terms of doubts about the strength of the case that had
been
made for
military action against Iraq.
70