The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
undoubtedly
saved the lives of the crew by absorbing the majority of the blast
…
I doubt,
however, that it would have withstood the effects of a […] (which
is the usual
weapon of
choice) if it had been rigged up to the remote initiator. This
observation
and the
fact that the C*95
was fitted
in both vehicles and operational indicates that
we are
still some way short of providing adequate levels of protection for
the
principal
threat in Iraq. In terms of drills, the habit developed in Northern
Ireland of
deploying
top cover to counter direct attack on the vehicle may actually be
exposing
our
soldiers to greater danger from IEDs – a threat not seen in
Northern Ireland.”96
193.
Although the
rate of attacks against Coalition Forces had levelled off,
February
2004 was
the worst month for casualties since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s
regime.97
194.
From March
2004 onwards the deteriorating security situation in Iraq took a
serious
turn for
the worse. That is addressed in Section 9.2.
195.
Maj Gen Stewart
told the Inquiry that the violence started to increase in
“February/
196.
Maj Gen Stewart
explained that 50 percent of his force was assisting
Security
Sector
Reform (SSR) during this time. He said that SSR continued in April
(although it
reduced to
25 percent of his force’s time) but that “one or two of the major
incidents we
had was
people … actually moving from location to location to try and help
the SSR”.
197.
On 3 February
2004, Gen Jackson wrote to Mr Hoon about the impact
of
maintaining
the current and forecast level of military commitment:
“… in
meeting essential short term operational demands we must take care
not to
prejudice
our ability to meet longer term rebalancing goals … Measures in the
EP
threaten
our ability to meet our strategic objectives in the longer term,
particularly
with regard
to introducing a medium weight intervention capability centred
on
198.
On 26
February, the DMB agreed a large number of service
enhancements
and savings
measures as part of a Spending Review.100
That was in
response to the
imposition
of new controls introduced by the Treasury (addressed in Section
13.1).
199.
The DMB
considered a paper by Mr Trevor Woolley, MOD Finance Director,
which
detailed
all the measures.101
In relation
to PPVs, he referred to Project DUCKBOARD as
95 A
cipher has replaced the name of this capability for national
security reasons.
96
Minute
Figgures to CDS, 8 February 2004, ‘SBMR‑I Report 072 of 8
February’.
97
JIC
Assessment, 25 February 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
98
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, pages 74‑75.
99
Minute CGS
to PSO/CDS, 3 February 2004, ‘Operational Tempo’.
100
Minutes, 26
February 2004, Defence Management Board meeting.
101
Paper
Finance Director, [undated], ‘ST/EP04: Years 1 and 2’.
36