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13.1  |  Resources
300.  Mr Blair concluded that:
“(a) DFID and MOD should draw up a plan for immediate humanitarian action in the
area of operations of British forces.
(b) Planning for medium‑term post‑conflict action should continue on the
assumption that a UN mandate (the ‘third/fourth resolutions’) would be
forthcoming … The FCO should prepare a Phase IV plan with other
departments, including the key decisions for Ministers to take.
(c) The Chancellor should draw up a funding plan, including securing funding from
wider international sources, in particular the IFIs.
(d) The Prime Minister was prepared to pursue with President Bush our need for
a UN mandate for a post‑conflict administration.”180
301.  Mr Blair stated that the issue of “sectorisation” (whether to seek general
responsibility for the administration of a geographic area of Iraq) would need to be
addressed and should be covered in the Phase IV plan.
302.  The record of the meeting did not report any discussion on whether the UK had the
resource to make an exemplary effort in providing for basic humanitarian needs in the
area controlled by the UK Division.
303.  The ‘UK overall plan for Phase IV’ was shown to Mr Blair on 7 March.181 Much of
the plan, prepared by the IPU, was drawn from the annotated agenda prepared for the
meeting on 6 March.
304.  The plan stated that, “very soon” after the start of hostilities, the UK needed “to
agree what our medium‑term contribution to Iraq should be (say from the autumn
onwards). For this will shape our conduct in the short term.”
305.  The Inquiry has seen no response to the Phase IV plan.
306.  On 14 March, in response to Mr Blair’s request for a funding plan, Mr Bowman
sent No.10 a Treasury paper on financing reconstruction.182 The paper was copied to the
Cabinet Office, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the MOD, the FCO and DFID.
307.  The Treasury advised that the total cost of humanitarian relief and reconstruction
in Iraq could be up to US$45bn over the first three years. Iraqi oil might only pay
for a fraction of that. The UK’s approach should be to spread the burden as widely
as possible.
180 Letter Cannon to Owen, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post‑Conflict Issues’.
181 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Weekend Papers’ attaching Paper IPU,
7 March 2003, ‘The UK overall plan for Phase IV’.
182 Letter Bowman to Cannon, 14 March 2003, attaching Paper Treasury, March 2003, ‘Financing Iraqi
Reconstruction’.
493
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