8 | The invasion

275. When Lt Gen Wallace’s comments were put to him, Gen Jackson said that the Iraqi

irregular forces were regime supporters who were resisting because they had “nowhere

else to go, their futures were pretty limited”.

276. Reporting on the first week of the campaign, the British Embassy Washington

wrote on 29 March that President Bush was “irritated by suggestions that the war plan

has gone awry”.162 He was taking steps to manage that by giving “Americans the big

picture”. As a result, the Embassy noted that the Administration was increasingly willing

to “take the gloves off” in its conduct of the campaign.

277. AM Burridge commented in his end of tour report that in the first week the Iraqi

regime “had maintained a surprisingly effective hold on media activity, arguably winning

the early Information Operations (IO) battle”.163

278. Lt Gen Brims told the Inquiry that:

“… we did expect irregular forces in their various ways and they probably fought

more voluminously and venomously than we had anticipated …” 164

279. Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations)

during the invasion, told the Inquiry that, one week in, UK forces had “found ourselves

confronting … Iraqi conventional forces but also feeling … enveloped on our own rear

areas by Iraqi irregulars … It represented a dimension that we hadn’t expected to find

at that stage.” 165

280. Mr Hoon told the Inquiry that the speed of advance left rear troops more vulnerable

to Fedayeen attack.166

281. The debate on the next steps of the campaign continued in the UK.

282. At the request of Sir Richard Dearlove, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, his

Private Office drew Sir David Manning’s attention to an account from SIS9 of a meeting

between Maj Gen Wall and senior US military officers in CENTCOM which had taken

place early on 28 March.167 Maj Gen Wall had briefed the US “on the UK strategy in

Basra”. Other points made in the account included:

• The Coalition “needed a victory soon”.

• “The battle for Baghdad could not commence with Basra and the South so

insecure.”

• The US “would ideally need” 7 Armoured Brigade for the attack on Baghdad.

162 Telegram 416 Washington to FCO London, 29 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The First Week’.

163 Report Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation TELIC Hauldown Report’.

164 Public hearing, 8 December 2009, page 40.

165 Public hearing, 16 December 2009, page 60.

166 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, pages 114-5.

167 Letter PS/C to Manning, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Losing the hinterland’ with UK document, [undated],

‘Iraq: Losing the hinterland’.

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