The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

410.  On 8 November, the JIC issued an Assessment of Al Qaida’s strategy.189 The JIC

judged that:

“Iraq is currently central to the core Al Qaida leadership’s focus of effort. The

situation there has significantly increased … [their] opportunities to confront

Western, particularly US, interests. It has also provided access to extremist

networks across Europe that may extend the core Al Qaida leadership’s ability to

conduct terrorist attacks, including in the UK. The core Al Qaida leadership sees an

opportunity to establish a base in an ungoverned and exploitable space in the Sunni

areas of Iraq.”

411.  On 10 November, Dr Reid wrote to Mr Blair about the transition to Iraqi

responsibility for security in Muthanna and Maysan.190 His letter said:

“Military judgement remains that it would, in principle, be possible to hand over

responsibility for security for the Iraqis in Muthanna and Maysan provinces by

around February 2006.”

412.  The letter explained that two factors implied a need to extend that timetable: the

failure of the Iraqi Government to set out the context for transition and the US desire to

maintain a Japanese presence in Iraq combined with unwillingness by the Japanese to

move away from Muthanna.

413.  Dr Reid reported that Prime Minister Ja’afari had agreed the conditions for transfer

set out by the JCTSR and that a public handling strategy for their release was being

developed. The assessment of provinces and cities that were likely to move to Iraqi

security control was unlikely to take place until after the December election.

414.  On force levels, Dr Reid wrote:

“The extension to the timeline for the handover of security to the Iraqis in MND(SE)

has force level implications. Assuming security conditions allow, reductions in UK

force numbers which might have been possible from around February might now

be deferred to early summer (May), when we should be able to reduce our troop

numbers in MND(SE).”

415.  Mr Straw visited Baghdad from 10 to 11 November.191 He saw representatives

from the two main Sunni Arab coalitions, the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue and the

National Consensus Front, and urged them to take full advantage of the opportunity

offered by the elections.

189  JIC Assessment, 8 November 2005, ‘Al Qaida’s Grand Strategy’.

190  Letter Reid to Blair, 10 November 2005, [untitled].

191  eGram 18079/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 14 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Visit by Secretary of State,

10‑11 November: Sunni Arab Outreach, Electoral Process’.

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