10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

227. Mr Straw reported that the UK’s approach to ORHA had been “cautious”. The UK

would have preferred an organisation less closely tied to the Pentagon and less subject

to US inter-agency politics. There were also significant legal questions. Against that

background, the UK had seconded 12 military and civilian officers to ORHA in Kuwait

and the Pentagon. Their role was to influence ORHA’s thinking on key Phase IV issues

and to ensure that information flowed from theatre to the UK Government, including on

commercial opportunities.

228. Mr Straw continued:

“… whatever its shortcomings, ORHA will be the essential element in the ability of

the Coalition to carry its military successes into the post-conflict phase. The legal

constraints are unlikely to be a problem in the first stage of ORHA’s work, which

will be focused on immediate humanitarian and reconstruction needs, including the

restoration of a functioning civil administration …

“I therefore recommend a step change in the resources and personnel we offer …

We are working urgently to establish where we can best make a contribution and

how this will be funded.

“We now need an immediate effort across Government and with the private sector to

get UK experts into key Iraqi ministries quickly. Patricia [Hewitt] is particularly keen

that we should appoint people to the economic ministries …”

229. Sir David Manning commented to Mr Blair:

“J[ack] S[traw] rightly calling for a step change in our contribution to ORHA. But legal

constraints/possible veto power may be problematic.”137

230. Mr Straw described his visit to ORHA in Kuwait in his memoir:

“I could not believe the shambles before my eyes. There were around forty people in

the room, who, somehow or other, were going to be the nucleus of the government

of this large, disputatious and traumatised nation.”138

231. Maj Gen Cross sent his “Must – Should – Could” paper to the MOD and the IPU on

15 April.139

232. The “musts” included:

• a secondee to ORHA’s Leadership Group;

• three secondees to ORHA’s public affairs and media office;

137 Manuscript comment Manning to Prime Minister, 16 April 2003, on Letter Straw to Prime Minister,

15 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)’.

138 Straw J. Last Man Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor, MacMillan, 2012.

139 Minute Cross to MOD (MA/DCDS(C)), 15 April 2003, ‘ORHA posts UK manning: must/should/could’.

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