The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

684. From early July, security was seen in Whitehall as the key concern and was raised

by Mr Blair with President Bush.

685. A circular analysis began to develop, in which progress on reconstruction required

security to be improved, and improved security required the consent generated by

reconstruction activity. Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff

(Commitments), reported “a decline in Iraqi consent to the Coalition in MND(SE) due to

the failure by the Coalition to deliver improvements in essential services” and that Shia

leaders were warning of a short grace period before further significant deterioration.

686. By the autumn of 2003, violence was escalating in Baghdad and attacks were

becoming more sophisticated. Attacks on the UN in August and September, which

injured and killed a number of UN officials including the UN Special Representative for

Iraq, prompted some organisations to withdraw their international staff. Although Basra

was less turbulent than the capital, the risk of a ripple effect from Baghdad – as identified

by Gen Jackson in May – remained.

687. The JIC assessed on 3 September that the security environment would probably

worsen over the year ahead. There had been a number of serious attacks on the

Coalition in MND(SE), and Islamic “extremists/terrorists”239 were expected to remain

a long‑term threat in Iraq. The UK’s military and civilian representatives on the ground

were reporting a growing insurgency in central Iraq.

688. Despite that evidence, military planning under the leadership of General

Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff, proceeded on the basis that the situation

in Basra would remain relatively benign.

689. The Inquiry considers that a deterioration in security could and should have been

identified by Lt Gen Reith by the end of August 2003 and that the cumulative evidence

of a deteriorating security situation should have led him to conclude that the underlying

assumptions on which the UK’s Iraq campaign was based was over‑optimistic, and

to instigate a review of the scale of the UK’s military effort in Iraq.

690. There were a number of issues that might have been examined by such a review,

including:

• whether the UK had sufficient resources in MND(SE) to deal with a worsening

security situation; and

• whether the UK should engage outside MND(SE) in the interests of Iraq’s

overall stability (as had been advocated by Gen Jackson, Maj Gen Richards

and Lt Gen Pigott).

691. No such review took place.

239 JIC Assessment, 3 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Threats to Security’.

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