The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
582.
Sir Michael
Wood had provided advice on the possibility of legal challenge
in
583.
Lord
Goldsmith stressed the importance of the principle of
proportionality
in the use
of force during the campaign.
584.
Addressing the
principle of proportionality, Lord Goldsmith stressed that
the
lawfulness
of military action depended not only on the existence of a legal
basis,
but also
on the exercise of force during the campaign being
proportionate.228
585.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote that any force used pursuant to the authorisation
in
resolution
678 must have as its objective the enforcement of the terms of the
cease‑fire
contained
in resolution 687 and subsequent relevant resolutions; be limited
to what
is
necessary to achieve that objective; and must be a proportionate
response to that
objective.
That was “not to say that action may not be taken to remove Saddam
Hussein
from power
if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and
proportionate
measure to
secure the disarmament of Iraq. But regime change cannot be the
objective
of military
action.”
586.
Asked if he
thought that the matter would be closed by his 7 March
advice,
Lord Goldsmith
told the Inquiry:
“… at the
time, I thought it was, because I thought I had given the green
light in
February, I
was following precedent in giving the green light again, and I
thought,
therefore,
the issue was closed, and therefore, if, politically, the decision
was taken
wherever it
needed to be taken in the United Kingdom, and no doubt the
United
States,
about military action, then that would be it.
“…
[R]ecognising that things could change, I said … we would need to …
assess the
strength of
the legal case in the light of circumstances at the time if there
were
a failure
to obtain the second resolution …”229
587.
Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon, Dr John Reid, Minister without Portfolio, and the
Chiefs
of Staff
had all seen Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March before the No.10
meeting
on 11
March, but it is not clear how and when it reached
them.
588.
Other
Ministers whose responsibilities were directly engaged,
including
Mr Gordon
Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Ms Short,
the
International
Development Secretary, and their senior officials, did not
see
the advice.
227
Minute Wood
to PS [FCO], 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq’.
228
Minute
Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution
1441’.
229
Public
hearing, 27 January 2010, pages 175-176.
106