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4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
552.  The Butler Report noted that the two reports, “including one which was important in
the closing stages of production of the Government’s September dossier, must now be
treated as unsafe”.
553.  The Butler Report’s comments on the decision not to show the reporting to DIS
experts is addressed in Section 4.2.
MINISTERIAL AWARENESS THAT THE REPORTING HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN
554.  Mr Blair and Mr Hoon became aware that the reporting had been withdrawn
as a result of the Butler Review.
555.  In the No.10 press briefing on 16 July 2004, Mr Blair’s Official Spokesman was
asked why Lord Hutton had not been informed that the intelligence had been withdrawn
a month before Mr Scarlett had given evidence to the Hutton Inquiry.207 The Spokesman
replied that SIS validation of the intelligence was still “ongoing” and that at the time
Mr Scarlett gave evidence, “this matter was still being investigated”.
556.  Asked about Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence to the Hutton Inquiry that the
information in the dossier was “sound” and whether the SIS decision not to inform
Lord Hutton that the intelligence had been withdrawn meant that Sir Richard’s evidence
had been “wrong”, the Spokesman replied that “Lord Hutton had been investigating the
controversy surrounding the 45-minute claim, not the wider intelligence picture”.
557.  Asked when Mr Blair had “discovered” that the intelligence had been withdrawn,
the Spokesman replied that Mr Blair “had not known at the time he had given evidence
to Lord Hutton [on 28 August 2003]” that the intelligence had been withdrawn “because
the process of validation had been ongoing”. Mr Blair had “found out” that the
intelligence had been withdrawn “as a result of the Butler Inquiry”.
558.  In Written Questions to Mr Blair, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, Mr Adam Price
(Plaid Cymru) asked each of them when they were:
“… informed that SIS had withdrawn reporting from the source who claimed
that production of biological and chemical agents had been accelerated by
the Iraqi regime, because the source of the reporting had subsequently been
deemed unreliable.”
559.  Mr Straw replied on 20 July:
“I became aware of the withdrawal of this reporting when I agreed, in response to
a request from SIS on 8 September 2003, that the reports in question should be
disclosed to the Intelligence and Security Committee.”208
207  The National Archives, 16 July 2004, Press Briefing: 11AM Friday 16 July 2004.
208  House of Commons, Official Report, 20 July 2004, column 176W.
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