The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
140.
Mr John
Hutton, the Defence Secretary, wrote to Mr Brown after he
visited Iraq
in October:
“The Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF), the Army in particular, are looking
confident and
capable.
Their show of force in the areas which I visited, where they took
the lead
in
providing my security, was genuinely impressive. There is no doubt
that Basra
itself has
been transformed and the ISF now have complete freedom of
movement
throughout
the city. While they do not yet have all the capabilities that we
would like
to see in a
fully‑formed Division, and there is important work still to do, we
will soon
have
reached the point where we can say with confidence that we have
fulfilled our
training
mission for 14 Division …”78
141.
On 27 March
2009, a junior official informed Mr Brown that 14th Division
was
considered
to be effective and that all UK mentors and trainers had been
withdrawn.
142.
Between 2003
and 2009, there was no coherent US/UK strategy for SSR in
Iraq.
143.
In 2003, the
UK expected the production of an SSR strategy to be led by
the
US and,
when it was clear that one did not exist, was unable to exert the
necessary
influence
on the CPA in Baghdad to ensure that one was
developed.
144.
As a
consequence, instead of working within an SSR framework that
was
understood
and agreed between international partners, the UK developed its own
SSR
policies
and plans for MND(SE) without a clear understanding of how they
contributed
to –
or whether they were fully consistent with – the SSR approach
across Iraq.
145.
Without a
coherent US/UK strategy for SSR, the UK was unable to fully
understand
its role
and how or whether its plans contributed to the overall rebuilding
of Iraq’s
security
sector. It was unclear what success looked like and therefore how
to measure it.
146.
The
development of effective Iraqi Security Forces, which could take
the lead on
security
very rapidly, became a key element of the UK’s “exit strategy” for
Iraq. In the
absence of
a clearly defined end state, and driven by the desire to reduce UK
troop
levels, the
focus of SSR work became the quantity of officers trained, not
their quality.
There were
numerous warning signs that that was a flawed approach, including
reports
directly
from those on the ground and JIC Assessments. But there was a
reluctance to
pause and
consider what was required to deliver the quality
needed.
147.
After June
2004, it became even more challenging to reach consensus on
a
strategy
for SSR with the establishment of the Interim Iraqi Government,
another party
that was
expected to take the lead on developing a national SSR strategy.
That did not
happen.
78
Letter
Hutton to Brown, 23 October 2008, [untitled].
440