The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
14.
After Order
No.1 was signed, the UK, having recognised the Order’s potential
to
create a
pool of disaffected individuals and to deny posts to effective
public servants,
urged a
pragmatic approach to de‑Ba’athification in its contacts with the
US, including
at the
highest levels, but with little practical effect.
15.
In November
2003, the CPA decided to hand responsibility for
implementing
de‑Ba’athification
to the Governing Council (GC). There were misgivings about
the
decision in
the FCO but, rather than act on them, it relied on assurances that
the policy
was to be
implemented flexibly.
16.
Although it
would have been challenging to create, a more independent
oversight
body than
the GC would have been more appropriate. The decision to hand
over
responsibility
for implementation to a political body of this nature was, in the
Inquiry’s
view, a
mistake which left a critically important area of policy outside
the control of the
CPA, with
damaging consequences.
17.
One Iraqi
interlocutor suggested to the Inquiry that it would have been
preferable for
judges to
preside over the process but also recognised that the Iraqi court
system was
not in a
fit state to take on additional responsibilities in
2003.
18.
As soon as it
was appointed, the High National de‑Ba’athification
Commission,
steered by
Dr Ahmed Chalabi and Mr Nuri al‑Maliki, took action to
toughen the
impact of
de‑Ba’athification. Both officials and military commanders
recognised
almost
immediately that such action was likely to generate further
instability, but the
CPA’s decision
to hand over responsibility to the GC left the UK unable to
intervene.
The UK,
however, remained responsible for security in the South in the face
of a
growing insecurity.
19.
The enthusiasm
for de‑Ba’athification felt by many Iraqi political leaders
–
Dr Chalabi
and Mr Maliki in particular – may well have made any policy
change difficult
to achieve.
This enthusiasm reflected a deep‑seated fear within the Shia
community of
the
resurgence of the Ba’ath Party and a return to Sunni
dominance.
20.
After the
appointment of the Interim Transitional Government in June 2004,
the
coalition’s
responsibilities in Iraq shifted, but it retained considerable
influence over the
development
of the political process.
21.
By the time of
Iraq’s first post‑invasion elections, de‑Ba’athification had
already
been
identified as a major political issue because it put a substantial
barrier in the way
of Sunni
engagement with the political process. Although the UK placed a
high premium
on
successful and inclusive elections, attempting to remove the
barriers imposed by
Order No.1
was not made a priority.
22.
Increasing
codification of the extent of de‑Ba’athification, in the
Transitional
Administrative
Law and then the Iraqi Constitution, was one crucial way in
which
60