The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
63.
Lieutenant
General Sir Robert Fulton, who succeeded ACM Stirrup as
DCDS(EC),
told the
Inquiry:
“My take on
it would be that we went to Iraq with our Cold War capability, that
there
simply was
not time between 1998 and 2002 to re-orientate a Capital
Equipment
Programme
that stretched for 20 years.”27
“… it was
not possible in the time that I saw it from the time I was first
engaged in
the
equipment area to be able to turn a Cold War-equipped military into
a flexible,
deployable,
sustainable military within the life of the equipment
plan.”28
65.
The MOD’s
initial thinking on options for military operations in Iraq focused
on
the
deployment of an Army division. That would require a minimum of six
months’
lead time
and ideally longer.
66.
Consideration
of the UK’s options in the event of a US-led military invasion of
Iraq
began at
the end of February 2002. That is addressed in detail in Section
6.1.
67.
This Section
considers the arrangements made for providing equipment to forces
as
part of the
planning process for potential operations in Iraq.
68.
On
6 March 2002, the Chiefs of Staff were informed that Iraq was
“sliding rapidly up
the scale
of interest and a degree of strategic planning was essential at
some point in
the near
future, given the lead times necessary to shape pol/mil thinking
effectively”.29
69.
The Chiefs of
Staff agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall, Vice Chief
of
the Defence
Staff, who was chairing the meeting in CDS’ absence, should
“refresh” work
on Urgent
Operational Requirements (UORs)30
to ensure
that it was not left “too late”.
70.
On
3 April, Sir Kevin Tebbit asked Mr Trevor Woolley, MOD
Director General
Resources
and Plans (DGRP), “just by way of prudent contingency planning
you
understand
… what a deployment to Iraq of a Division minus (25-30,000 with
enablers)
would do to
our SDR force structure and concurrency assumptions, assuming all
other
operations
remained more or less as they are”.31
Sir Kevin
asked Mr Woolley not to
share the
work with the Commitments area of the MOD.
27
Public
hearing, 27 July 2010, pages 8-9.
28
Public
hearing, 27 July 2010, page 19.
29
Minutes,
6 March 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
30 An
Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) seeks to address a capability
gap by rapidly procuring
new or
additional equipment or the enhancement of, or essential
modification of, existing equipment.
The procurement
process is described in Section 14.1.
31
Minute
Tebbit to DG RP, 3 April 2002, ‘Iraq Pre-Contingency Mind
Clearing’.
12